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ABSTRACT 
While most of the world's media remains focused on insurgent attacks on 
coalition forces, oil facilities and Shia and Sunni sectarian attacks in Iraq, 
Pakistan is experiencing a rising tide of violence in the country's volatile 
Balochistan province, where the majority of the energy-starved country's natural 
gas facilities are located. Pakistan, currently engaged in a drawn-out conflict 
against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in its North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP), is slowly descending into conflict with anti-government forces in 
Balochistan province, raising the unsettling prospect of a rising second internal 
front against militants. A second internal front would drain resources from 
Pakistan's ability to maintain effective, smooth and stable control over the law 
and order situation in the country and its campaign against al-Qaeda and Taliban 
remnants in the NWFP and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). 
Under the prevailing situation conventional means to bring about peace 
and encouraging environments for political and economic stability seem to be 
elusive. In this thesis an effort will be made to uncover the root causes, historical 
perspective and genesis of socio cultural setup in Balochistan, so that the 
modern techniques and tools of IO/IW can be used to recommend useful options 
to deal with the situation by the Pakistan government. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Balochistan contains 44 percent of Pakistan's total land mass and is the 
largest of the country's four provinces. The province is strategically vital as it 
borders Iran, Afghanistan, FATA and the Arabian Sea. The capital city of Quetta 
lies near the border of Afghanistan and has road connections to Kandahar to the 
northwest. Islamabad also sees the province as essential to its future prosperity, 
building a $1.1 billion deepwater commercial and naval port at Gwadar on the 
Arabian Sea. China contributed about $200 million toward the construction cost 
of Gwadar's first phase, which was completed in April 2004. China seems to 
have interests extending far beyond Gwadar. 
India is also interested in Balochistan province as a transit point for a 
projected $4.5 billion Iran-India natural gas pipeline expected to be operational 
by 2010. India also discussed with Pakistan plans by both countries to import gas 
from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and from Qatar (balochistan.org, March 4, 
2007). Balochistan's natural gas production is critical to Pakistan's economy. The 
Sui natural gas field in Balochistan's Bugti tribal area produces approximately 45 
percent of the country's total gas production, with Pakistan Petroleum Limited 
producing 720-750 million cubic feet of gas daily from more than eighty wells in 
the field (Business Recorder, July 30, 2004). A safe estimate reveals that the 
province of Balochistan has nineteen trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves 
and six billion barrels of oil reserves on-and off-shore (Business Recorder, May 
14, 2004). 
Despite the province's wealth of natural resources, Balochistan is 
Pakistan's poorest province, with 45 percent of the population living below the 
poverty line. There is rising resentment in the province that despite the fact that 
its natural gas generates $1.4 billion annually in revenue, the government remits 
only $116 million in royalties back to the province (Dawn, February 6). After the 
U.S. campaign against the Taliban began in November 2001, Balochistan 
 xviii
became a critical escape route for al-Qaeda and International Islamic Front 
refugees attempting to flee via Karachi to Yemen. After U.S. operations against 
Iraq began in March 2003, Balochistan became an increasingly important theater 
of operations for al-Qaeda and International Islamic Front guerrillas in their 
efforts to attack U.S. economic interests in Pakistan in retaliation for the U.S. 
campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq (South Asia Analysis Group, January 24, 
2003). 
In 2003, resentment among Baloch chiefs boiled over into intermittent 
armed conflict with the Pakistani Army. By July 2004 the rising violence in 
Balochistan forced a U.S. company involved in offshore drilling to abandon its 
two test wells between Gwadar and Pasni because of security concerns for a 
loss of nearly $26 million (Business Recorder, July 30, 2004). On January 18, 
2005, a major attack disrupted Sui's output. In the aftermath of the attack, the 
government rushed hundreds of troops to the area. At least eight people died in 
the violence, which caused a production loss of more than 43,000 tons of urea 
and caused a daily electricity shortfall of about 470 megawatts (BBC, January 18, 
2005). Balochistan's turbulent year of 2005 ended with an attack on the head of 
state. On December 14, Balochistan Liberation Army militants launched six 
rockets, three of them landing near a paramilitary camp in Kohlu that Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf was visiting 135 miles east of Quetta. Pakistan 
government described the attack as an assassination attempt and three days 
later launched a full-fledged army operation in Kohlu district's Marri-Bugti areas 
against local "miscreants" and "saboteurs." Besides the militant tribal Balochistan 
Liberation Army, some analysts believe that Taliban and al-Qaeda guerrillas 
have also been using Balochistan to move back and forth between Pakistan and 
southern Afghanistan (Voice of America, March 2).  
While it seems that al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain focused on their 
campaign against ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and U.S. forces 
in Afghanistan's eastern provinces and Pakistani Army units in the NWFP, the 
possibility exists that they could move southeastwards to take advantage of 
 xix
Balochistan's growing unrest, linking up with militants operating out of Karachi. If 
the pressure on Islamist militants in the NWFP becomes too severe, then the 
distinct possibility exists that rather than face the ISAF troops in Afghanistan, 
they could migrate to Balochistan and pressure the Pakistan government by 
threatening the critical infrastructure. 
 An escalating conflict in Balochistan can only drain resources from 
Pakistan's war on terrorism on its border with Afghanistan and frighten the 
foreign investment community away from the province, which will be a key player 








Balochistan, a land of lofty mountains and vast barren wastelands and 
lush green valleys, is the largest province of Pakistan. It is bordered in the west 
and northwest by Iran and Afghanistan, in the north by the provinces of Punjab 
and NWFP, in the east by the province of Sind and in the south by the Arabian 
Sea. It has common borders of 832 kilometers (km) with Iran and 1,160 km with 
Afghanistan, while it has 560 km of coast commanding the Arabian Sea. It 
guards the Gulf and is the western-most part of South Asia. Thus, its 
geographical location makes it a strategic area of immense importance. 
However, the history of the province after the independence is marked by a 
volatile environment and point of concern for the nationalists’ politicians and the 





Figure 1.   Map of Balochistan Province1 
 
The history of Balochistan has imprints of the reluctance by the Khan of 
Kalat to join Pakistan, the insurgencies of 1958 and 1973 beside the recent low 
level uprising in many parts of the province.2 The issues reflected by the 
nationalist elements such as exploitation of resources of the province by the   
non–Balochi’s, unemployment, demographic changes in the province in the 
name of development, demand of autonomy, the sense of deprivation and the 
issue of gas royalty have dominated the political landscape.3 The involvement of 
the regional powers for their vested interests has also been fueling the political 
scene. Above all these factors, the most dominant one remains the exploitation 
                                            
1 Wikipedia,Balochistan (Pakistan), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_(Pakistan)#_ref-0 
(accessed July 14, 2007). 
2 Syed Iqbal Ahmed, Balochistan, its strategic importance (2002), 2. 












of human resources through an age-old “Sardari System” which is the negation 
of development and prosperity in the region as well as a reflection of the bad 
governance in our society.  
When the government of Pakistan realized the mistake committed by the 
governments one after another to ignore the development process in Balochistan 
and initiated a series of mega projects, it faced resistance from the Maliks and 
Sardars who feared that their age-old control and hegemony over the locals 
would be at stake in the process. The miscreants and rebels exploited the 
sentiments of resentment of the people who always felt that they are not in pace 
with the other parts of the country for socio-economic development. The 
development of mega projects and the keen interest of China in these mega 
projects also attracted foreign governments, regionally and globally, to safeguard 
their own interests and also to exploit the situation to their own benefit. The 
turmoil in Balochistan has been further compounded due to the prevailing 
situation in neighboring Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan’s resolve 
against the al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the Northwest Frontier province 
and adjoining tribal areas. For bringing the so-called left-out province of 
Balochistan in line with the developmental course of the rest of the country, a 
need is therefore felt to unchain the people and politics of the province from the 
rule of feudal, the known “Sardars,” and apply some modern tools and 
techniques of information warfare by espousing a wholesome response to settle 
on the concern. This thesis has been divided into following chapters. 
• Chapter I provides an introduction to the thesis and it’s contents. 
• Chapter II discusses Balochistan’s History and Demography. 
• Chapter III deals with the tribal structure and the genesis of the 
Sardari System.  
• Chapter IV provides analysis of the impacts of the Sardari System 
on the socio-politico make up of Balochistan. 
• Chapter V discusses the internal dynamics of Balochistan and the 
1973 insurgency. 
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• Chapter VI deals with the current turmoil, mega projects and foreign 
involvement in the region.  
• Chapter VII discusses the IO domain, methods and options 
available to deal with a situation like the one in Balochistan, and the 
U.S. perspective. 
• Chapter VIII discusses whether or not IO can diffuse the situation in 
Balochistan, as well as the applicability of IO capabilities in 
Balochistan. 




II. BALOCHISTAN’S HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHY 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In spite of the intrinsic hostility of its landscape and climate, archaeological 
discoveries have confirmed that Balochistan was already inhabited in the Stone 
Age, and the important site at Mehrgarh is the earliest (7000-3000 B.C.) on the 
subcontinent.4 Until its overthrow by Alexander the Great, Balochistan was part 
of the Persian Empire, whose records refer to it as "Maka." In 325 B.C. 
Alexander led part of his army back from his Indus campaign to Babylon across 
the Makran Desert at the cost of terrible suffering and high casualties. Thereafter, 
Balochistan lay for centuries on the shadowy borderlands of the Zoroastrian 
rulers of Iran and the local Buddhist and Hindu dynasties of the northwestern 
subcontinent. 
Islam was brought to Balochistan in A.D. 711 when Muhammad bin Qasim 
led the army which was to conquer Sindh across the Makran route, but the area 
was always too remote for firm control to be exerted by any of the later local 
dynasties.5 Accordingly, it receives only very passing mention in the court 
histories of the time. The inland areas were variously connected with Iran, 
Afghanistan and India, where those of coastal Makran were across the Arabian 
Sea with Oman and the Gulf. The name "Balochistan" only came into existence 
later with the arrival from Iran of the tribes called Baloch (usually pronounced 
"Baloch" in Pakistan). Just how and when they arrived remains a matter of hot 
debate, since the traditional legends of their Middle Eastern origins, supposed to 
have been in the Aleppo region of Syria, have been further confused by theories 
                                            
4 Mansoor Akbar Kundi, “Tribalism in Balochistan: A Comparative Study,” in Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan: Challenges and Responses (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute and 
Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2005), 23. 
5 M. Longworth Dames, “Balochi Folklore,” Folklore 13, no. 3 (September 29, 1902): 252-74; 
Ibn Aseer 3: 17; Tarikh al Khulfa 1: 214-15,229. 
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either that, like the Pathans, they may descend from the Ten Lost Tribes of 
Israel, or that they originated from Babylon, since "Baloch" is phonetically similar 
to the names of the God Baal or the Babylonian ruler Belos. 
Better evidence is suggested by the Balochi language which belongs to 
the same Iranian group of Indo-European as Persian and Kurdish.6 This 
suggests that the Baloch originated from the area of the Caspian Sea, making 
their way gradually across Iran to reach their present homeland in around A.D. 
1000, when they are mentioned with the equally warlike Kuch tribes in Firdausi's 
great Persian epic, the Book of Kings: Heroic Balochs and Kuches we saw, like 
battling rams all determined on war. The history of the Baloch has certainly 
always been warlike. As the last to arrive of the major ethnic groups of Pakistan 
they were faced with the need to displace the peoples already settled in 
Balochistan. Some of them were, more or less, successfully subjugated or 
assimilated, like the Meds of Makran and other now subordinate groups. From 
others they faced a greater challenge, notably from the Brohi tribes occupying 
the hills around Kalat. 
The origins of the Brohi tribes are even more puzzling than those of the 
Baloch, for their language is not Indo-European at all, but belongs to the same 
Dravidian family as Tamil and the other languages of south India spoken over a 
thousand miles away.7 One theory has it that the Brohis are the last northern 
survivors of a Dravidian-speaking population which perhaps created the Indus 
Valley Harappan civilization; but it seems more likely that they, too, arrived as the 
result of a long tribal migration at some earlier date from peninsular India. 
As they moved eastwards, the Baloch were initially successful in 
overcoming the Brohis. Under Mir Chakar, who established his capital at Sibi in 
1487, a great Baloch kingdom briefly came into existence before being destroyed 
by the civil war between Mir Chakar's Rind tribe and the rival Lasharis, whose 
                                            
6 Qazi Azher Mubarek Puri, Rashidun Caliphate and Hind (Takhliqat: Lahore Pakistan). 
7 Akhtar Husain Siddiqi, Baluchistan (Pakistan): Its Society Resources and Developmen” 
(University Press of America, 1991), 21-3. 
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battles are still celebrated in heroic ballads. Although the Baloch moved forward 
into Punjab and Sindh, the authority of the Moguls stopped them from 
establishing permanent kingdoms there; although the names of Dera Ghazi Khan 
in Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP (North Western Frontier Province) are 
still reminders of the Baloch chiefs who conquered these lands in the 16th 
century. The Baloch who settled in the plains gradually became largely 
detribalized, forgetting their native language and becoming increasingly 
assimilated to the local population, with their tribal origins remaining little more 
than a proud memory.  
In Balochistan itself, which came only briefly under the authority of the 
Moghuls, the tables were turned on the Baloch by the Brohis who succeeded in 
re-establishing their power in Kalat. Throughout the 18th century, the Khans of 
Kalat were the dominant local power, with the Baloch tribes settled to the west 
and to the east of them being forced to acknowledge their suzerainty. The 
greatest of the Khans was Mir Nasir Khan (1749-1817), whose military success 
owed much to the regular organization of his army, with its separate divisions 
recruited from the Sarawan and Jhalawan areas which constitute the northern 
and southern parts of the Brahui homeland.8 The Khanate of Kalat became the 
nearest thing there has ever been to an independent Balochistan. This extended 
beyond the modern boundaries, since Mir Nasir Khan's authority ran as far as the 
then insignificant town of Karachi. Although dominated by the Brohis, they 
themselves became increasingly "Balochified."  
With the British expansion into the northwestern subcontinent and their 
disastrous first Afghan War (1839-1841), internal power struggles within Kalat 
prompted the first British military interference, and the signing of a treaty in 
1841.9 The British annexation of Sindh in 1843 from the Talpur Mirs, themselves 
a dynasty of Baloch descent, and the subsequent annexation of Punjab meant 
                                            
8 Balochistan History, http://www.baloch2000.org/history/baloch.htm (accessed July 2007). 
9 Syed Iqbal Ahmed, Balochistan, its Strategic Importance, (2002), 47. 
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that Kalat and the other regions of Balochistan were now part of the sensitive 
western borderlands of British India, where the possibility of Russian interference 
induced a permanent state of imperial neurosis. Although the eastern Baloch 
tribes were partially pacified by the efforts of Sir Robert Sandeman, it was 
thought easiest to leave the Khan and his subordinate chiefs in control of most of 
the rest of Balochistan. A further treaty was signed in 1876, which forced the 
Khan to 'lease’ the strategic Quetta region to the British but left him in control of 
the rest of his territories with the aid of a British minister. Granted the rank of a 
19-gun salute to mark the size if not the wealth of Kalat, the Khans were for a 
while content to pursue the eccentric Iifestyle characteristic of so many south 
Asian princes of the time. One Khan became legendary as a passionate collector 
of shoes, and made sure no pair would ever be stolen by locking up all the left 
shoes in a dungeon below the Fort at Kalat. 
With the last ruler of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1902-79), the Khanate 
again briefly entered the political arena. Exploiting the opaque clauses of the 
1876 treaty, which left some doubt as to just how independent Kalat was 
supposed to be, he hesitated to join Pakistan in 1947. The brief independence of 
Kalat finally ended in 1948, when the Khan signed the necessary merger 
documents, followed by his formal removal from power and the abolition of the 
state's boundaries in 1955. The present shape of Balochistan was finally rounded 
out in 1958 when the Sultan of Oman sold Gwadar, given to one of his ancestors 
by the Khan of Kalat, back to Pakistan. To understand the present situation, 
however, it is necessary to look more closely at Balochistan’s history, and in 
particular the role played by the British in the region.  
B. THE BRITISH INVOLVEMENT 
In the early 19th century, when the British had established their supremacy 
in the subcontinent, Russia was advancing southward into Central Asia. The 
British government in London was perturbed and considered it an imminent 
threat to the security and tranquility of the British Indian Empire and asked their 
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government in India to checkmate the Russians.10 Thus began the British 
involvement in this region. Up until that point the area now forming Pakistan (i.e., 
Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province) and the tribal 
belt were practically independent.  
Accordingly, in 1838, Auckland, the British Governor General of India, 
decided to dispatch his forces to Afghanistan through Sindh and Balochistan but 
was disastrously defeated in Afghanistan. To rehabilitate British prestige and 
control the region, the English occupied Sindh in 1843 and Punjab in 1849 and 
established their hold in Balochistan from 1854-76. The British were able to 
consolidate themselves in Balochistan with relative ease as compared to the 
tribal belt in the NWFP. The reason was that Balochs would normally follow their 
chiefs or 'Maliks' known as Tumandars. They had a common overall head, the 
Khan of Kalat. In 1854 an agreement was concluded between the British and the 
Khan who promised not to have relations with any foreign power without the 
approval of the English; to receive British troops when necessary; to protect 
merchants passing through his territory; and to prevent his followers from raiding 
British territory. In return for all of this he was to receive an annual subsidy of 
150,000 Rupees. Thus a system of subsidy was introduced to purchase the 
loyalty of the Khan. As the control exerted by the Khan was not very strict, these 
arrangements ultimately did not suit the British.  
With a view to further consolidate their hold, further negotiations were 
conducted with the Khan of Kalat and a fresh treaty was signed at Jacobabad in 
1876. The British succeeded in getting Quetta and the surrounding area together 
with Bolan Pass on lease. The agreement required the area to remain under 
nominal sovereignty of Kalat but to be administered by the British. A British 
Indian force was stationed at Quetta and Sir Robert Sandamen was appointed 
the first Agent to the Governor General in Balochistan. He tactfully established  
 
                                            
10 Ansar Abbasi “What Balochistan Deserves,” The News International, (Islamabad, 
September 7, 2006). 
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contacts with the tribal chiefs and succeeded in maintaining peace in the area. 
The arrangement is known as the Sandamen System and also as the Khasadar 
System.  
It rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and the tribal territory 
in considerable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and leaving 
the tribes to manage their own affairs according to their own customs and 
working through their own chiefs and Maliks. The Maliks were required to enlist 
levies paid by the government but were regarded as tribal servants. The British 
achieved the objective of their own protection, keeping roads open and in case of 
trouble, locating the troublemakers. They would give monetary benefits to the 
tribesmen under the supervision of the Maliks in return for maintaining order in 
the tribe. For this cooperation, the Maliks also received large subsidies.  
After independence in 1947, the princely states of Lasbela, Mekran and 
Kharan, as well as Kalat, acceded to Pakistan. Pakistan continued to follow the 
British policy of administering Balochistan through their Maliks/Sardars. The 
government under Iskander Mirza purchased Gwadar from the Emirate of Oman 
and made it a part of Balochistan, which was then made a full-fledged province 
under President Yahya Khan in 1970.  
C. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BALOCHISTAN 
The current situation has many dimensions - political, economic, and 
social, along with the element of foreign involvement, in particular the situation in 
Afghanistan in context of the GWOT (Global War on Terrorism). There is also the 
problem of security of national and public assets. Politically, Balochistan 
remained at a disadvantage for a long time. It did not enjoy the status of a 
province for a quarter of a century after independence.11 Its first provincial 
assembly was elected as a consequence of the 1970 elections conducted under 
                                            
11 Abbasi, “What Balochistan Desrves.” 
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Yahya's12 government. During the government of the Pakistan People's Party 
under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it was alleged that some of Baloch Sardars were 
activated by foreign powers, mainly Soviet Russia, and arms coming for them 
from Iraq were captured at the Islamabad airport. Soon, a situation of 
confrontation between the provincial government of Balochistan and the federal 
government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto developed as a result of the 
latter's plans for social and political reforms in the province. The government of 
Balochistan was sacked and military action was initiated in 1973. This was a 
setback to the democratic political process. During the government of Zia ul Haq 
there was a return to the old policy of reconciliation with Sardars and peace was 
restored in the province. Under Ziaul Haq, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, 
Balochistan experienced more or less the same political evolution as the rest of 
the country except that under Benazir, the Balochistan assembly was dissolved 
in 1988 but was revived under orders of the High Court. Nevertheless, the 
dissolution of provincial assembly created a lot of resentment against the centre.  
Now the federal government seems determined to develop Balochistan 
and about 130 billion rupees worth of projects have been sanctioned. The most 
prestigious project is that of Gwadar Port.  
                                            
12 General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was born at Chakwal in February 1917. After 
completing his studies from the Punjab University, Yahya Khan joined the Indian Military 
Academy at Dehra Dun. He was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1938. His early postings 
were in the North West Frontier Province. During World War II, he performed his duties in North 
Africa, Iraq and Italy. After Independence, Yahya Khan played a major role in setting up the 
Pakistan Staff College at Quetta. During the war of 1965, he commanded an infantry division. He 
was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army in 1966 with the rank of General.  
When, in 1969, countrywide agitation rendered the situation out of control, Ayub Khan 
decided to hand over power to the Army Chief, General Yahya Khan. Immediately after coming to 
power, Yahya Khan declared Martial Law in the country on March 25, 1969, and assumed the title 
of Chief Martial Law Administrator. He terminated the Constitution and dissolved the National and 
Provincial Assemblies. On March 31, he also became President of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan.  
Immediately after taking charge of the country, he started looking for options through which 
he could hand over power to the elected representatives. On March 29, 1970, through an 
Ordinance, he presented an interim Constitution, the Legal Framework Order. It was actually a 
formula according to which the forthcoming elections were to be organized. It goes to the credit of 
Yahya Khan that the first general elections in the history of Pakistan were held during his regime 
in December 1970. 
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D. DEMOGRAPHY 
The province of Balochistan is unique in its geo-political significance. It 
has a total area of 34,056 square kilometers which forms 44% of Pakistan’s land 
mass and has a 770 km long coast line.. It consists of arid basins and various hill 
ranges, sharply marked off from the Indus plain by the Kirther and Sulaiman 
ramparts. It exhibits a great variety of physical features, consisting of vast rocky 
desert with extremes of climate and very low rainfall. In the northeast, the Zhob –
Loralai basin is surrounded by mountains on all sides. The Quetta basin is also 
surrounded by mountains, namely Zarghun, Takatu, Khilafat, Chiltan and Murdar 
Ghar. In the north and northwest, the lobe is bordered by the Toba Kakar Range. 
The general terrain of northwestern Balochistan comprises a series of low-
lying plateaus, some of which are separated by mountain ranges. Southern 
Balochistan includes the Sarawan area in the north and a vast wilderness of 
ranges in the south. The Balochistan plateau extends westward and averages 
263 meters high, with many ridges running across it from northeast to southwest. 
It is separated from the Indus plain by the Sulaiman and Kirther ranges. It 
consists of dry valleys, saline lakes and a vast area of desert with dry hills, 
generally running across the plateau from the northeast to southwest.   
Economically, its vast rangelands, large number of livestock, rich mineral 
and gas deposits, and quality deciduous fruits are of significant value although 
there is relatively little industrialization in the province. Balochistan’s arid but 
diverse climatic zones have contributed to a rich animal and plants biodiversity 
while building a definitive cultural heritage that has allowed survival in this rugged 
and harsh landscape. 
E. BALOCHISTAN AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
Balaochistan occupies a special strategic position in the geography of 
Pakistan.  An area of 0.35 million square kilometers inhabited by only 6.6 million 
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people with a population density of about 19 persons per square kilometer.13  
More than 20 percent of its population is concentrated in urban areas.  
Balochistan for а long time оsсillаtеd between obscurity and prominence, but its 
geo-strategic importance never slackened. Its enduring importance lies in the fact 
that it is close to the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.   
Balochistan lies in а commanding position vis-à-vis the Straits оf Hormuz, 
one of the choke points of the Indian Осеаn and the World. Its trijunctional border 
in the northwest links Seistan (Iran) and Helmund (Afghanistan) with Chagai 
(Pakistan), overlooking the Mashad-Zahedan-Chabahar Highway. In the 
northeast, the inland constrictions like the Khojak and Bolan Passes (opposite 
Kandahar) are some of the most important bottlenecks in the region from the 
geo-strategic point of view. They were important for Czarist Russia and Victorian 
England in the past, and they remain so today. 
Balochistan’s political boundaries do not conform to its ethnic orientation; 
instead they vary widely. From a population perspective, it encompasses а large 
chunk of Iran, Afghanistan and parts of Sindh, Punjab and NWFP of Pakistan. 
The Encyclopedia of Islam describes Balochistan by stating that, "It includes the 
whole country over which Baloch race is spread without regard to political 
boundaries.” According to ethnic configuration, the Baloch inhabit parts of 
Helmund, Nemroz and many other parts of Afghanistan, Balochistan under the 
Iranian occupation, and Seistan (Iran), Sindh, Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan 
under Pakistan. Due to its relief, or physical features, the Greek historian 
Herodotus had divided Balochistan into three distinct parts, which by and large 
conform to the description given bу the Encyclopedia оf Islam. They were: 
• Aracosia comprising Kandahar and the Quetta Region. 
• Drangiana, including Helmund, Seistan and Chagai. 
• Gedrosia comprising (currently under Pakistani and Iranian 
occupied) Makran Coast. 
                                            
13 Amir-ul-Mulk Mengal, “Study in Balochistan,” (group research paper, 2004), 3.   
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The fact is that large chunks of Eastern Iran, Southern Afghanistan and 
Pakistani Balochistan are so identical in geography and ecology that they form 
one natural region. According to Sir Denys Bray, “Together they appear more 








III. TRIBAL STRUCTURE AND THE GENESIS OF THE 
SARDARI SYSTEM 
A. TRIBAL STRUCTURE 
The population of Balochistan is sub-divided into various tribes and sub-
tribes. These tribes are independent and are vehemently against any outside 
influence. Tribal Sardars enjoy complete authority over the lives and property of 
their tribes.14The traditions and customs of one tribe differ with the customs and 
traditions of other tribes. In a number of cases the customs of other tribes are 
taken as major abuse within a particular tribe. The some of the details about 
major races are described in the following paragraphs. 
1. Baloch Tribes15 
The Balochs are traditionally nomadic tribes which migrated from the 
Euphrates and Tigris river areas of Iraq.  The Baloch tribes are further divided 
into twenty-one sub-tribes, each having distinct tribal traditions. The major sub-
tribes of Baloch tribes are listed below.  
a. Bugti 
The Bugtis are one of the largest and important Baloch tribes. Like 
others, they are comprised by a mixture of many other Baloch tribes. The 
majority of them, however, are of Rind lineage. They occupy the southeastern 
portion of the Sibi District.  
 
                                            
14 M. Sardar Khan Baloch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan (Karachi: Process 
Pakistan, 1958). 
15 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan 
(Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1974), 319. 
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b. Bungulzai 
The Bungulzai are an important Baloch tribe of Rind extraction. 
They are to be found in Mastung, Quetta, Dasht, Sibi and Kachi. The tribe is bi-
lingual, speaking both Balochi and Brohi. 
c. Jamali 
This tribe is a clan of the Rinds. The main body of the tribe lives in 
Nasirabad, in the neighborhoods of Khosa, Buledi and Jakhran tribes. At present, 
they are said to be good agriculturists and cultivators who no more report to 
nomadic life. 
d. Kaisarani 
Karisaranis are said to have been founded by a Rind named 
Kaisar. They are settled in Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP and in Punjab, while they 
dwell among the Bijarani clan of the Marri tribe in Balochistan. 
e. Marri 
This is the largest and one of the most important Baloch tribes. 
They are of Rind extraction. This tribe was founded by Mir Bijar Puzh Rind, son 
of Mir Perosh, who was killed in the Rind-Lashari battle at Nali along with Mir 
Bibrak, Mirhan and other Rind warriors. The tribe is divided into three main 
divisions, namely Bijarani, Gazeni and Loharani. 
f. Mazari 
Like the Laigharis, it is one of the major organized Baloch tribes in 
Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab. Most of the tribe is said to be of Rind origin. A clan 
of Kurds also forms a part of this tribe. The tribe is thus a combination of several 
other Baloch tribes. 
 
 17
2. Brohvi Tribes 
Brohvi is from a Persian word “Barohi” means a hillman. They are 
excellent mountaineers and sharp shooters. Some important Brahvi tribes are 
listed below. 
a. Bizinjo 
This tribe claims to be a division of the Rind Baloches. When Mir 
Chakar Rind had moved to the Sibi and Kachi regions, this tribe, along with the 
Mengals, remained in the Jhalwan mountains in the regions of Nal and Ihaljao.  
b. Mengal 
This tribe consists of three factions called Shahizai, Zagar and 
Samalani. Shahizai Mengals live at Wadh in the Jhalwan mountains of the Kalat 
District, while Zagar Mengals dwell in the Chagai District Samalanis, being 
nomads, keep moving in search of fresh pastures in the Kachi, Kharan and 
Chagai Districts. 
c. Mohammad Hassani 
They are recorded as Persian-speaking, and hence Baloches. Like 
the Haroonis, they claim to have migrated from the province of Faras in Iran. 
d. Rinds 
Among the Balochs, the Rinds need no introduction because it was 
under the leadership of Mir Jalalhan Rind that forty-four different Baloch tribes 
migrated from Seistan to Makran, and then spread out in Balochistan, Sindh, 




e. Zehri (Moosiani) 
They claim to be Baloches. At one time, they were a dominant tribe 
in the Jhalwan region of the Kalat District, until it was replaced by the Zarakzai 
faction of the Zehris.  
3. Pakhtun Tribes16 
The Pathans form approximately 28 percent of the Balochistan population, 
but occupy only one-fifth of the area in the northern and northeastern parts of the 
province.  They are a dominant community in terms of literacy, economy and 
share in the government services, and have almost monopolized the trade. Even 
in the field of agriculture, the main produce of Balochistan comes from Pathan 
areas. Their further distribution in the major tribes is described below. 
a. Kakars 
This is the biggest tribe of Pathans, inhabitating Quetta and Zhob 
Division and the Ljoralai, Pishin and Musa Khel Districts.  They are a warlike 
tribe.  Kakars have a reasonable political standing, represented through the 
Kakar Group headed by ex-Provincial Minister Malik Sarwar Khan Kakar (from 
Pishin).  Kakars are generally better educated and have always influenced the 
Balochistan Government due to the presence of their  MPAs in the government.  
b. Achakzais 
They are the descendants of Ahmed Shah Abdali owing to which 
they are a proud race.  They mostly dwell on the Pak-Afghan border and vast 
numbers of them live in Afghanistan.  The Achakzais are politically one of the 
most active and militant tribes, living around Pishin, Chaman, Gulistan and 
Quetta. 
 
                                            
16 Mengal, “Study in Balochistan,” 13-96.   
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c. Ghilzais 
The Ghilzais migrated from Afghanistan during the 17th century and 
settled in the Zhob, Qila Saifullah and Loralai Districts.  They are educated and 
involved in agriculture and trading. 
B. THE GENESIS OF SARDARI SYSTEM 
1. Overview of System 
The “Sardari” regime in Balochistan is a system of indirect rule in which 
the central authority chooses to leave certain areas of the country to be 
controlled by local chieftains, who profess allegiance to the state and 
acknowledge its “strength.” They raise revenue, apply local customs to settle 
disputes and dispense “justice,” and maintain order to the extent they can or 
deem expedient.17 Many observers are inclined to attribute Balochistan’s relative 
underdevelopment to the tribal Sardars’ determination not to let forces of 
modernization, such as education and economic diversification, enter their areas. 
They fear that the resulting enlightenment will arouse their hitherto oppressed 
tribesmen to self-assertion. Tyranny of the feudal lords in Sindh and southern 
Punjab has likewise been blamed for the stark poverty and backwardness of the 
peasantry in these regions as well. 
2. The Origin 
The Sardari system traces its origin back to the 17th century when tribes 
were organized with the mutual consent of tribesmen as part of the Khanate 
Confederacy.18 The system was undermined by the British after they established 
their rule in Balochistan.19 The system continued after independence due to lack 
                                            
17 Daily Times, Reasons for Unrest in Balochistan,  
www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.aspstory_31-1-2005, 3, (accessed July 2007). 
18 Khair-un-Nisa, Baluchistan Through The Ages, vol. 2 (1906), 17-53. 
19 Syed Abdul Qaddus, The Tribal Baluchistan (Ferozsons, 1990), 58. 
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of literacy, economic development and good governance. The Sardari system is 
a century’s old institution, which still exists in a number of Baloch and Brohi areas 
of Balochistan. The understanding of the Sardari System is not possible without 
tracing its origin at the time of the emergence of the Kalat Confederacy founded 
by Mir Ahmed Khan in 1666.  
The Kalat State was one of the leading and rich states that extended its 
sovereignty from the upper terrain of Sindh and the Suleiman Range to the 
shores of Mekran/Gwadar. It comprised three states: Mekran, Kharan and 
Lasbella. These states enjoyed autonomy but pledged allegiance to the Khan of 
Kalat, Mir Khudadad Khan. He organized the tribal system and asked the three 
rulers to do so. The three rulers individually enjoyed the command over their 
respective heads of tribes. The heads were known as Sardars or Nawabs. The 
Sardars were assisted by Waderas depending on numerical and resource-wise 
strength of the tribes. Sardars and the command they enjoyed over their tribes 
served as a bulwark of the sovereignty of the Kalat State as well as for mutual 
defense.  
3. British Involvement 
Soon after the British took control of Balochistan, the major changes they 
made, in support of divide-and-rule policy, was to transform the Sardari ystem 
from the traditional lines into a new one. Under the new system, better known as 
the Sandeman System, a Sardar could remain in office as long as he enjoyed the 
support of the British in keeping the tribesmen intact and silent. Under the Treaty 
of Kalat in 1883, one of many treaties between the Sardars and British, Sardars 
were given regular allowances, concessions and privileges for their loyalty to the 
Raj. The Sardar-Raj relationship was based on a carrot-and-stick policy. Thus 
the nucleus of Sardars' loyalty shifted from Meeri, the palace and seat of rule of 
the Khanate of Kalat, to the British Residency in Quetta, and the Khan lost 
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control over the Sardars. Under the Sandeman System, the major role of the 
Sardars was their allegiance to the Empire by keeping his tribesmen subdued.20 
4. The Crisis of the Sandemanian Sardari System 
In 1947 the crisis of political development, which dashed the hopes of a 
representative system in the country, left the Sardari System untouched. The 
revival of democracy in 1970 brought new hopes of development and democracy 
for the common man against Sardari order. Ataullah Mengal, a Sardar, stepped 
into the office of Chief Minister with the JUI-coalition (Jamiiat Ulma-e-Islam) 
support to represent the interests of the province in the new setup. But the hopes 
proved to be short-lived due to dissolution of the Balochistan assembly by Z. A. 
Bhutto, which finally led to a martial law. During this period, the Sardars/Nawabs 
were re-strengthened against tribesmen after huge funds poured into their 
pockets without any accountability. Bhutto abolished the Sardari System in July 
1976, but its roots were not dissolved.  
5. Present Tribal Feuds 
Like all other tribal cultures, almost every tribe in Balochistan is nurturing 
some enmity resulting in feuds which have continued for decades. These 
clashes, which started due to extremely petty differences, have taken many lives 
and have virtually isolated the concerned tribes, stalling their social growth by 
diverting all of their energies in seeking revenge. Some of the major tribal feuds, 
along with their reasons for feuding, are as follows: 
• Nawab Akbar Bugti vs. Kalpars – murder. 
• Nawab Akbar Bugti vs. Ahmedans – murder. 
• Bugtis vs. Mazaris – murder and land.  
• Bugtis vs. Raisanis – murder.  
• Gazinis vs. Bejranis (clans of Marris) – land and murder. 
• Hameedzais vs. Ghaibezais (Clans of Achakzais) – murder.  
                                            
20 Khair-un-Nisa, “Baluchistan Through The Ages.  
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• Rind vs. Raisani – murder. 
• Suleman Khels vs. Lawoons – land and murder. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS OF THE SARDARI SYSTEM ON 
THE SOCIO-POLITICO COMPOSITION OF BALOCHISTAN 
A. IMPACT/FALLOUT OF SARDARI SYSTEM 
1. Political Landscape 
Balochistan is ethnically divided into Pashtoon and Baloch zones. Any 
charismatic leader from one zone or group may never be acceptable to the other 
group, thus unanimous leadership of the province has been very difficult. Politics 
in Balochistan have generally revolved around pro- and anti-federation elements 
wherein sub-nationalist parties, headed by Sardars, have caused a considerable 
nuisance. Balochistan has never had a strong and stable political government. 
Present coalition government, instead of leading the province out of its crisis of 
lawlessness and lack of development, is further compounding the issue. 
Nepotism, discrimination and tribal preferences are dragging the province into 
further chaos. The legislators, busy criticizing each other, enhancing their 
privileges and securing more development funds, are not interested in improving 
the law-and-order situation of Balochistan. This deplorable political landscape 
has given rise to certain complex crises in the region, a few of which are 
elaborated on below. 
a. Sub-Nationalism 
The sub-nationalist movement in Balochistan traces its history to 
the pre-independence era when the Baloch National Party (BNP), under Ghaus 
Bakhsh Bizenjo, opposed annexation of the State of Kalat with Pakistan. 
Following the government action against the Khan of Kalat in 1956, the 





Pakistani Balochistan, Afghani Nimroz and Helmund provinces, and Iranian 
Seestan-o-Balochistan province.21 The main themes propagated by these sub-
nationalist leaders are: 
• Reject the Punjab’s dominance accusing it of looting the resources 
of Balochistan. 
• Resist the establishment of military garrisons in the province to 
minimize the army and federal government influence. 
• Hindering mega-development projects by deeming them as against 
the larger interest of Balochistan. 
• Spreading venomous propaganda against the government, army 
and the Punjab. 
• Accusing the government of handing over Baloch coastal areas to 
the U.S.A. in order to establish the CENTCOM Headquarters. 
b. Sectarianism 
A province that once boasted of its sectarian harmony has, in the 
recent past, witnessed terrible violence in the name of religion. In this regard, a 
deliberate attempt is being made to add another dimension to the worsening law-
and-order situation of Balochistan.  
c. Smuggling of Arms and Ammunition 
The smuggling in Balochistan is neither considered an illegal or 
immoral act today, nor was it in the past; it is merely considered a trade activity 
with greater risks. Contraband goods are abundantly available in the province 
and almost every effort to prevent this large scale smuggling has failed. The 
smuggling of arms and ammunition added another dimension to the internal 
situation, thus giving rise to lawlessness in the province.  
                                            
21 Trade across Frontiers in Balochistan, 
http://www.weeklyindependent.com/archives/Issue2001/opinion3.html  (accessed June 2007). 
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d. Socio Economic Status 
Lack of interest in the socio-economic development of the province 
displayed by all previous governments has created a sense of deprivation, thus 
providing an excuse to the sub-nationalist parties for airing sentiments against 
the Punjab and federal government. The major contributory factors towards the 
present socio economic state of the province are: 
• Lack of interaction of people of Balochistan with the people of other 
provinces due to lack of a communication infrastructure. 
• Nominal representation of Balochis in the armed forces and 
bureaucratic cadres, especially in senior ranks. 
• General unemployment amongst skilled and unskilled people. 
• Insufficient and inefficient social services. 
• Unfounded feeling of discrimination in the accountability process. 
• Poor economic conditions as a result of limited agriculture, industry, 
mining projects and provision of inadequate funds through NFC 
(National Finance Commission) Awards.22 
e. Major Socio-Economic Problems 
The major problems being faced by people are outlined below. 
(1)  Lack of Communication Infrastructure  Balochistan 
has only 2,100 kilometers of black top roads as compared to approximately 6,000 
                                            
22 NFC Award i.e. National Finance Commission (NFC) award is the distribution of financial 
resources among the provinces of Pakistan by the federal government on an annual basis. 
Pakistan has seven NFC awards todate. The lack of consensus in the National Finance 
Commission had delayed the announcement of the seventh NFC Award. As a result, the sixth 
Award, which lapsed in the year 2002, was still being adhered to. Then after a meeting between 
the president and the chief ministers (CMs), the four CMs empowered the president to take the 
final decision. Therefore, now the president has announced the seventh NFC Award through an 
ordinance. His fresh steps have revealed that the President believes in inter-provincial harmony. 
Since no consensus could be developed on a new NFC award and for that reason he had 
decided to offer more money to the provinces through a new resource distribution formula and 
decided to amend article 160 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to make the 
existing divisible pool more attractive for the federating units. 
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kilometres in NWFP and much more in Punjab and Sind. Similarly, the entire 
network of railway that exists was laid during 1885-95. The lack of infrastructure 
has not only made the development tedious and slow, but has also cut off the 
population of this province from rest of the country, creating an acute sense of 
deprivation. 
(2)  Low Literacy Rate and Students Unrest  The literacy 
picture here is grim as not only is the literacy rate low, the quality of education is 
also poor. Politicization of educational institutions and strong student 
organizations have rendered the administration ineffective. The graduates here 
are thus not proficient in their respective fields, which results with the youth of 
Balochistan fail to compete at the national level. Thus, Balochistan remains out of 
the mainstream. 
(3)  Lack of Social Services  Most of the people are 
unaware of the concept of social services. Healthcare, electricity, clean drinking 
water, gas, telephone services, etc. are considered privileges instead of basic 
necessities. Moreover, the existing services are not very efficient, except at the 
provincial capital.23    
(4)  Unemployment  Unemployment, particularly amongst 
the educated youth, is high. Thus, they feel deprived and frustrated. The general 
complaint is that the federal government is not adhering to the ‘quota’ of 
Balochistan. Lack of industrial activity and the unwillingness of Nawabs to allow 
development has further worsened the situation. The unemployed youth, 
therefore, are left with few other options but to take up arms.24 
                                            
23 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, hrcp-web.org/balochistan_mission.cfm.html 
(accessed July 2007). 
24Balochistan’s Youth; Options Open,   www.balochistan.org/modules.php.html (accessed 
July 2007). 
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2. Impact on the Current Law-and-Order Situation 
Balochistan has its own law-and-order matrix wherein tribal conflicts, 
poverty, the weak writ of government, unabated smuggling, gun running and 
availability of safe havens produce an environment where crimes are more 
frequent and acceptable then other parts of the country. Balochistan, due to its 
size, ethnic demarcations and holdings of Sardars, can be divided into distinct 
zones, each having its own problems and key players. The important trouble 
areas under the influence of Sardars are listed below. 
a. Armed Opposition to Military Cantonments 
The perception being propagated by Sardars, for their vested 
interests, is that the establishment of cantonments at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and 
Kohlu are not meant for development, but for repression and control of the 
Baloch people.   
b. Marri Area 
The inaccessible, barren mountains of these areas are notorious 
refuges for criminals and outlaws, housing most of the existing Ferrari Camps of 
Balochistan.25 These Ferrari Camps, where armed men are trained for terrorist 
activities, are patronized, funded and maintained by local Sardars. The major 
tribe inhabiting this area is the Marri, which is further divided into several sub 
clans. The most important of these clans are Ghazinis, led by Nawab Khair 
Baksh Marri, and Bejranis, led by Mir Hazar Khan Bejrani.26  
                                            
25 Balochunity.org, www.balochunity.org/index.php/facts (accessed April 2007). 
26 Studies conducted in command and staff college Quetta in 2003-2004 about Balochistan’s 
turbulent situation. 
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c. Dera Bugti and Sui 
After the discovery of natural gas, exploration companies and the 
government of Pakistan signed comprehensive agreements with local Chieftain 
Nawab Akbar Bugti. According to the agreements, gas companies were 
supposed to provide non-technical jobs and technical educational facilities to 
locals and undertake development activities besides giving gas royalty to Nawab 
Akbar Bugti. After the military takeover of October 1999, relations soured as gas 
companies felt more confidant in dealing with the unjust demands of Nawab. In 
order to maintain his writ and continue accruing benefits, Nawab resorted to 
attacks on gas pipelines, installations and law enforcement agencies, especially 
the Frontier Corps. He also established new Ferrari Camps and mined roads to 
coerce the government and gas companies. These practices caused 
considerable damage, both in terms of lives and property. 
d. Khuzdar and Wadh 
This area lies along the strategically important RCD (Regional 
Cooperation for Development) Highway linking Quetta with Karachi. Sardar Atta 
Ullah Mengal, the Chief patron of BNP (Balochistan Nationalist Party) claims to 
have come back to liberate the Baloch people. He has been seen as active in 
uniting the divisive forces of Balochistan. He has used PONM (Pakistan 
Oppressed Nations Movement) platform to project provincial issues at national 
and international forums. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal has also been active in 
forging alliances to bring Nawab Bugti, Nawab K. B. (Khair Baksh) Marri and 
Mehmood Khan Achakzai onto one platform, so that greater resistance will be  
offered to the mega projects initiated by the government.  
e. Mekran Coast 
This was traditionally known as a peaceful area. However, the 
initiation of mega-development projects, like Gwadar Deep Sea Port and Coastal 
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Highway, has attracted terrorists from across the province.27 These criminals, 
hiding in the mountains, believe that the interest of Balochistan and the Baloch lie 
in sabotaging these projects.  
f. Dasht (Noshki and Dalbandin) 
This vast and deserted area was relatively quiet until a few years 
ago. Apart from the smuggling activities, this area was only threatened by 
lawlessness concentrated in the Girdi Jungle. The sub-nationalists have recently 
carried out bomb blasts and rocket attacks in the city, which can be attributed to 
terrorists hiding in mountains located west of Mastung. This area also serves as 
a conduit for Iranian intelligence operations, human smuggling, and 
weapons/narcotics smuggling.  
g. Quetta 
During the last few years, Quetta witnessed numerous bomb 
explosions and rocket attacks which virtually became a routine activity. The 
situation, however, improved after the change of the police high command. 
h. Miscellaneous Factors 
A few of the miscellaneous factors contributing towards 
lawlessness in Balochistan are as follows: 
• A weak government and its failure to establish writ over the 
province, and friction between various parties including in the 
coalition government. 
• Recent incidents of sectarian violence and involvement of banned 
religious organizations are also contributing towards the worsening 
of an already poor law-and-order situation.  
                                            
27 The Nation, “Balochistan Situation,” nation.com.pk/daily/apr-2005/11/columns3.php 
(accessed March 2007). 
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• Geo-strategic interference: influx of Afghan refugees and covert 
involvement of foreign powers.  
• Enhanced activities of hostile intelligence agencies, using 
Afghanistan and Iran as their base to encourage sub-nationalist 
agenda. 
 
• The absence of mature and enterprising local media, both 
electronic and printed, has increased frustration in an environment 
where a vacuum of information enables the exploitation of the 
masses by pro-active sub-nationalists. 
i. Ferrari Camps28 
These camps located at Kohlu, Sibi, Dera Bugti, Loralai and 
Mastung are now fairly large, boasting the strength of approximately 20-200 
persons who are sufficiently equipped with automatic weapons, including rocket 
launchers, machine guns and mines, etc. According to recent patterns, a large 
number of Ferrari Camps, believed to be sponsored by influential Nawabs are 
providing shelter to absconders, criminals and terrorists equipped with the latest 
weaponry. There are over forty known Ferrari Camps in the province. The 
number of camps run by each tribe is as follows: 
• Bugtis   - 17 
• Gazini Marris  -   8 
• Bejrani Marris - 11 
• Rinds   -   1 
• Domkis  -   3 
• Total   - 40. 
                                            
28 Mengal, “Study in Balochistan,” 3-9.   
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V. POLITICAL SCENE IN BALOCHISTAN AND 1973 
INSURGENCY 
A. INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF BALOCHISTAN 
The politics in Balochistan have always revolved around the pro-federation 
and anti-federation elements. 
1. Pro-Federation Elements 
The national level political parties and some of the tribal Sardars coupled 
with religious parties form the bulk of pro-federation elements representing the 
vast majority of the population. These elements, being relatively less active, 
remain dormant and at the mercy of nationalist elements who happen to be more 
active and prominent even though they are in the acute minority.  
2. Anti-Federation/Nationalist Elements 
Nationalist movements in Balochistan had their genesis even before the 
creation of Pakistan. A nationalist party was formed in Balochistan in 1920. It was 
influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution of Russia. The party was against British 
rule and strongly opposed the leasing of Jiwani29 to the British in 1939. Fearing 
the dangers to his own rule, the Khan of Kalat banned the party. The party 
leaders were expelled from the state and they regrouped themselves in Quetta 
with the patronage of the Indian National Congress. After the creation of 
Pakistan, the discovery of natural gas at Sui, and other resources in the province 
provided an opportunity to the nationalists to keep alive their winning popularity 
by connecting their causes with the rights of the people of the province. The 
                                            
29 Jiwani port is located along Arabian Sea in Gwadar District, Balochistan, Pakistan. It is 
located near the Iranian border. It has a population of 25,000 and it is expected to become a 
major commercial center in concert with the development of the port of Gwadar located nearly 80 
Km to the east. Abstracted from wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiwani ( accessed  August 
15, 2007). 
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failures, misunderstandings and underestimation of the correct situation, and 
pushing the problematic situation under the carpet by the successive 
governments at the centre greatly contributed towards the spreading of 
nationalist tendencies in the province. 
B. THE POLITICAL SCENE UP TO 1973 
After their independence, the political turmoil in Balochistan took a number 
of turns. Some of the major turning points were as follows. 
1. Accession Problem 
The Khan of Kalat declared independence on August 15,1947. The states 
of Makran, Las Bela and Kharan acceded to Pakistan in March 1948. The 
accession of these states to Pakistan rendered the State of Kalat as landlocked 
from the Arabian Sea and the Persian border. The circumstances compelled the 
Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan on March 27, 1948.  
2. One Unit and Insurgency of 1958 
One Unit was the title of a scheme launched by the federal government of 
Pakistan to merge the four provinces of West Pakistan into one homogenous 
unit, as a counterbalance against the numerical domination of the ethnic Bengalis 
of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).30 The One Unit policy was announced by 
Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali on November 22, 1954. It was highly 
unpopular in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP as it did not guarantee equal rights 
for provinces with lesser population. Under these circumstances the Khan of 
Kalat declared independence and called on the tribesmen to rise against 
Pakistan. This forced the government to take action and as a result the Khan of 
Kalat was arrested, his palace was raided, and he was deprived of his ancestral 
valuables. His supporters took up arms against the government and demanded 
                                            
30 Story of Pakistan, “Timeline events 1947-1958,” June 1, 2003, 
http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A137 (accessed August 15, 2007). 
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the immediate release of the Khan of Kalat and abolition of the One Unit system. 
They were assured that they would be granted amnesty if they laid down their 
arms. After they surrendered, most of them were arrested and some of them 
hanged for treason and martial law was imposed.  
3. Aftermath of the 1970 Elections 
The elections of 1970 saw the emergence of NAP and other nationalist 
parties gaining a majority. A coalition government with nationalist tendencies 
came to power headed by Nawab Akbar Bugti. In subsequent years, the centre 
provincial confrontation escalated to an unpleasant level and ended in an armed 
rebellion against the government. 
C. THE 1973 INSURGENCY 
1. Prevailing Environments in 1973 
Emboldened by the stand taken by Sheikh Mujib in former East Pakistan 
(now Bangladesh), the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists demanded their 
“provincial rights” from Ali Bhutto in exchange for approving the 1973 constitution 
consensually. Tensions erupted and within six months the federal government 
sacked the governments of Attaullah Mengal in Quetta and Mufti Mahmud in 
Peshawar. The two Chief Ministers, along with Governors and forty-four MNAs 
(Member of National Assemblies) and MPAs (Member of Provincial Assemblies), 
were arrested and charged with treason. As a result, an insurgency erupted and 




                                            
31 Jānmahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982).  
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2. Causes of Insurgency 
a. Demand for a Separate State 
This factor has been an important political demand of some Baloch 
Sardars ever since Pakistan came into being, as consolidation under Pakistan 
threatened their absolute rule.  
b. Influence of the Sardari System 
Sardars have remained the executive branch of the tribal 
organization. Any threat to the Sardari System was ferociously resisted, as was 
the case in 1973.  
c. Economic Causes 
(1)  Lack of Development Efforts  The development of the 
area and the provision of civic facilities was a serious threat to the authorities of 
Sardars. 
(2)  Minerals Royalty Issue  Following the discovery of 
mineral reservoirs, Sardars strongly felt that some royalty must be paid to them. 
Moreover, most of the gas being extracted out of Balochistan was used in Sind 
and Punjab. Thus, this fact was used as an important tool for propaganda.  
(3)  Sense of Deprivation  While the Sardars themselves 
never let the development work take place in the area, they successfully sold the 
notion of deprivation to their innocent tribes, laying the blame for the people’s 
fate on the government.    
d. Exploitation by Foreign Elements 
The area was of great interest to the former Soviet Union in 
pursuance of their southward drive. This included practical action aimed at 
Balochistan, like education at Soviet universities on attractive stipends, 
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sponsoring of pro-Soviet student organizations with monetary assistance and 
training for insurgency in foreign countries. The situation was exploited by 
Afghanistan and India, who supported various elements opposed to the 
government because of their own interests. 
3. Events Leading to Insurgency 
a. Instability in Jhalawan 
The late Doda Khan Zarakzai started collecting taxes in the 
Jhalawan area. He also started issuing warrants and awarding punishments.32  
All efforts by government officials had failed to restore peace in the region.  
b. Anti-Punjab Riots 
Along the Pat feeder canal in Sibi, the Punjabi settlers had 
purchased some land and developed it over the years.  On November 28, 1972, 
armed Bugti and Marri tribesmen attacked the Punjabis, killed five of them, 
kidnapped women, and burnt crops. 
c. Las Bela Incident 
By November 1972, the law-and-order situation in Balochistan had 
worsened.  Doda Khan Zarakzai, along with the Zehri brothers and Jam Ghulam 
Qadir, was fully committed to creating problems for the provincial government.33  
It included mischief like blocking highways and fights with Mengal tribesmen. 
d. The Outbreak 
Tension ridden Balochistan finally erupted into open hostilities in 
May 1973, with the dismissal of the provincial government by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto. This step was initiated by the government in view of anti-state activities of 
                                            
32 Jānmahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage, 16. 
33 Ibid.,17. 
 36
NAP Government, which had started openly supporting the dissident elements. 
The NAP Government had started making unrealistic demands on the central 
government so as to make the centre weak.34   
4. Operations by Insurgents  
a. Organization 
The insurgents operated in small groups of tens and twenties, 
under Mukkadams, who in turn were under the command of a Wadera/Sardar. 
b. Intelligence System 
All the elevated features in the area were manned by the 
miscreants. The observers had binoculars and passed messages by waving 
turbans,35 reflecting mirrors, lighting fires, etc. The custom of "Hal Ehwal"36 
amongst the tribal was also used for passage of intelligence. In this custom, 
tribesmen, while traveling, were asked for the latest information of intelligence 
value, and information of intelligence value was passed on.  
c. Logistic Support 
Under the NAP (National Alliance Party) Government, weapons 
and ammunition were purchased through a third party from the local market 
under the direction of the Sardar. For logistics support, the insurgents traveled 
light from base to base. The bases selected were such that they could get the 
support of locals to provide them food, shelter and information. 
 
 
                                            
34 Jānmahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage. 
35 Ibid., 20. 
36 Ibid., 61. 
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d. Method of Operations of Insurgents 
The subversive activities were mainly carried out in the forms 
described below.  
(1)  Sniping  Sniping is normally carried out at long ranges 
(400-500 yards). Sniping was normally resorted to in the following cases: 
• When the target was beyond their capability to ambush or raid. 
• To invite the troops to move into an area where an ambush was 
laid. 
• At places where the population was living peacefully so as to cause 
harassment. 
(2)  Ambushes  From the pattern of firing marks observed in 
the area, it was observed that hostiles used to organize themselves into two main 
groups37 which are: 
• Action Group: Further divided into two parties each consisting of 
10-15 men. One of the parties occupied the lower-most height, 
whereas the other one was at the highest point having good 
visibility. These parties positioned themselves 150-200m away from 
the roads. Upon the arrival of the target, both the parties used to 
open fire on the target from different directions. At the end of the 
ambush one of the parties used to carry out the search of the 
convoy to look for weapons and other equipment. 
• The Rearguards: These were comprised of 20-40 men and were 
tasked to establish the blocking positions in the area. 
(3)  Raids  Although it was not the common practice, at times 
the hostiles carried out raids of important installations. The tactics used were: 
• The target, after being observed for many days, was surrounded 
and attacked from many directions; swarmed, in other words. 
                                            
37 “An Account of Significant Ambushes in Marri Bugti Area During 1973-76,” (Handout by 
Headquarters 33 Division, 1998), 14. 
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• Fire was opened from any one direction, while the raiding party 
went into action. 
• Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the target was 
neutralized and destroyed. 
5. Counter Insurgency Operations by Pakistan Army 
a. Induction 
In February 1973, the situation was getting out of control. The 
Pakistan Army was called upon to restore the authority of the government. The 
army was primarily tasked to assist civil administration in restoring law-and-order, 
apprehending hostiles, securing lines of communication, and helping civilian 
administration in developmental projects. 
b. Deployment of Troops 
The army was deployed in three phases:  
• Phase 1 (May 1973 - July 1974). In this phase, initially two infantry 
brigades were inducted and later two more brigades were added. 
• Phase 2 (August 1974 - December 1975). During this phase, five 
infantry brigades were inducted in the area. 
• Phase 3 (January 1976 - July 1977). During this phase, only the 
replacement of units/formations was carried out. 
Total troop forces deployed during the operation were: 
• One infantry division, mainly in the Bugti and Marri area. 
• One infantry division with one additional brigade was in the Marri 
and Pathan area. 
• One infantry division was in Sarawan and Jhalawan area. 
• A Special Services Group kept centrally in Quetta. 
• The complete Frontier Corps of Balochistan. 
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c. Operations by the Pakistan Army 
The major operations carried out by the Pakistan Army were of two 
categories: the first category was in retaliation for hostile actions, and the second 
category was for search and cordon.  The major operations conducted by the 
army were: 
• Brown Arrow (Kohlu Sector).  
• Green Thumb (Jhalawan Sector). 
• Brown River (Kohlu – Sibi Sector). 
• Red Beret (Kohlu – Sibi Sector). 
(1)  The Turning Point  A major operation in the Kohlu area 
was carried out by two brigades in which 125 hostiles were killed and 916 were 
apprehended. Subsequently, three more operations were conducted in Kohlu 
and Sibi in which ten brigades participated. These operations left a lasting impact 
on the minds of insurgents and their approach changed. 
d. Effects of Operations 
In the initial stages of the operation, the army was not very 
successful in fighting the insurgents due to having adopted conventional tactics. 
In the second stage, the army learned about the tactics of the hostiles and 
conducted successful operations. At this point they started surrendering 
voluntarily. People came to know that the army was primarily intended to help 
them and was not their enemy as purported by the Sardars.  
e. Tactics Adopted by Government Forces 
Initially, the units operating against the insurgency lacked the 
experience of fighting an insurgency and adopted conventional drills for 
movements and fighting. Characteristically, troops carried out deliberate 
operations for 2-3 days in a particular area. Since there was no follow up, hostile 
elements could escape conveniently. But with the passage of time and 
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experience, the army started dominating the insurgents. Elements of the Special 
Services Group were inducted into the area with attack and cargo helicopters. 
Troops became more vigilant and the operations were executed for a longer 
period, until the insurgents were flushed out of their hideouts and surrounded. 
Eventually our troops became experts in using unconventional tactics and 
defeated the insurgents.  
f. Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People 
While these counter insurgency operations were still in progress, 
the government started a pacification program by introducing a number of 
projects in the economic and social fields for the betterment of the common 
people. These measures were intended to win the confidence of the locals and 
draw them away from the influence of their Sardars. Such measures had a 
positive effect on the people of the province. 
6. Difficulties Faced by the Pakistan Army 
The difficulties faced by the army in the initial stageare described below. 
• Lack of Efficient Intelligence. The intelligence setup in the area 
was not very effective, and the army paid a heavy price for its 
shortcomings in the initial phases of the operation.  
• Language Problem. A barrier in communication existed since the 
troops did not know the local language, nor did the locals 
understand the troops.  
• Knowledge of Area. The troops were not proficient in operating in 
an area like Balochistan, and were not familiar with the area. 
• Lack of a Communication Network.  The non-existence of a 
communication network hampered the speedy operations by the 
army, yielding sufficient time for insurgents to escape after an 
action. 
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• Problem of Identification. Initially, every civilian in the area was 
considered as hostile and treated accordingly, which resulted in 
hatred for the army amongst locals. Therefore, no help could be 
sought from locals. However, in the later stages of the operation, 
things started developing in a better way. 
7. Factors Contributing Towards Success 
In the second and third phases of the operation, the army took certain 
measures which helped in controlling the insurgency. These methods are 
identified below. 
• Non-Availability of Safe Heavens for Insurgents in Neighboring 
Countries. The insurgents did not find safe heavens in Iran and 
Afghanistan as the borders were sealed by government forces and 
the insurgent’s area of operation effectively circumscribed. 
• Resolve by the Army. The forces gave a vivid signal to the 
insurgents with respect to their resolve to stall the actions of 
miscreants and protect the geographical cohesion of the country. 
For example, the operations carried out by the army in the Kohlu 
area, with two brigades killing 125 and apprehending 916 
miscreants, and subsequently operations in the Kohlu and Sibi 
areas with 10 brigades left no doubt in the minds of miscreants 
about the resolve of the army to establish the writ of the law. 
• Bold Actions Against Hostile Leaders. In the initial stages of the 
operation the army was tasked with establishing small check posts 
in the area and to show force. Seeing the worsening situation, it 
was then tasked to undertake operations against the hostile 
leaders, and this led to achievement of better results.  
• Establishment of a Communication Network. There were a 
number of roads made by the army which helped in moving to 
remote areas. 
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• Establishment of Civil Administration. Civil administration was 
established and civilian officers were sent to the interior to find out 
the problems of the locals.  Army officers were inducted into the 
civil department, with a view to increase the efficiency of the related 
departments. 
• Pacification Measures. The effective pacification campaign 
(winning hearts and minds and carrying out projects for social uplift 
of the masses) also contributed towards the success of the counter 
insurgency operations. 
8. Lessons Identified 
The counter insurgency operations in Balochistan highlighted certain 
lessons. Some of theseinclude the following: 
• Rule of Law. The state must be able to assert its influence and 
control. Every citizen, regardless of which tribe, area, race or belief 
to which he belongs, deserves the same civil rights as the next 
man. Anyone who deprives or tries to deprive a fellow citizen of 
these rights is a criminal. Even after a major military operation, the 
same situation that existed before was allowed to sediment.  
• Lack of Developmental Effort. Absence of developmental work, 
education/civic facilities and non-involvement in national politics 
resulted in a lack of a national outlook and spirit in Balochistan. 
• Determination of Root Cause. To eliminate the insurgency, it is 
important to find out the root cause. While the center of gravity of 
the insurgency was identified and neutralized, not much was done 
thereafter to prevent the cycle from recurring. 
• Elimination of Support Base. For any insurgency to succeed, 
internal/external support is very important. Therefore, to fight 
insurgency, it is very important to find out the supporters and 
eliminate them. 
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• Method of Fighting with Insurgents. Conventional methods of 
fighting against the hostile opposition did not succeed. To defeat 
insurgents, the army had to adopt the same techniques as the 
hostiles, but they needed to employ them in a better way, such as 
the use of Heliborne Force/Special Services Group. 
• Efficient Intelligence. An efficient and elaborate intelligence 
network is a prerequisite for dealing with the insurgency.  
Knowledge and understanding of the local population, their way of 
life, traditions, customs and language are very useful tools for a 
counter insurgency operation. In Balochistan, the intelligence 
system was not very effective in the beginning; hence, the intensity 
of insurgency could not be determined during the initial stage. 
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VI. CURRENT TURMOIL, MEGA PROJECTS AND FOREIGN 
INVOLVEMENT 
A. THE SITUATION FROM 1973 – 2007 
1. Government Policies and Effects 
During the 1973 Insurgency, a pacification program was initiated aimed at 
winning the hearts and minds of the people. However, no permanent policies 
were formulated that could ensure a steady rate of development in the province. 
Successive governments failed to take this aspect into account, which resulted in 
increasing the gap between the development of Balochistan and the rest of the 
country. 
2. Political Developments 
In 1979, the government of General Zia ul Haq made an effort to reconcile 
itself with various nationalist elements. K.B. Marri, along with other tribal leaders, 
was released from prison. During the martial law regime, Balochistan generally 
remained peaceful. Tribal leaders were given important positions within the 
government hierarchy. However, from 1988 until 1998, Balochistan again 
remained partially ignored due to the instable political situation in the country. 
This had a negative effect on the overall development of the province. During the 
tenure of the present government, emphasis has been placed on political and 
economic development of the province, but it is probably a bit too late to offset 
the designs of the nationalists.  
3. Development Projects Undertaken 
The current government has taken the right approach of supporting mega  
projects in the Balochistan province, the effect of which would certainly add to the 
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overall socio-economic uplift of the region.38 The mega project of Gwadar Deep 
Sea Port is one such project.  
B. GWADAR MEGA PROJECT  
Pakistan is building a port at its southwestern city of Gwadar, which is 
located at the mouth of the oil rich Persian Gulf and is a possible distribution 
point for the natural resources of Central Asia.39 Figure 2shows the location of 
the Gwadar port. Islamabad is optimistic that the completion of the Gwadar port 
project will be a major step towards realizing Pakistan’s potential as a regional 
hub of trade and economic activities.40 The government of Pakistan’s vision is for 
Gwadar to be a link between the East and West that will change the national 
economy as well as the fate of this region.41 
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Figure 2.   Geography of the Gwadar Port 
 
C. NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL PORT  
1. Domestic 
Sea-borne trade makes up over 10 percent of the national income for the 
majority of the world’s top economies.42 Over 80 percent of international trade, 
when measured in weight and volume, is sea-borne, and containerized freight is 
likely to grow to 70 percent of this trade by volume by 2010.43 Pakistan’s GDP 
increased from $28.7 billion in 1983 to around $70 billion in 2003, and its 
dependence on sea trade increased to about 95 percent.44 The primary gateway 
for goods flowing across oceans remains ports. Pakistan presently has only two 
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commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the Indian Ocean, catering largely 
to the domestic needs. Pakistan’s sea-borne trade in the year 2000 was 42 
million tons, and by 2015 the trade forecast is 78 million tons annually.45 Both the 
Karachi and Qasim ports are reaching their cargo handling capacity and are 
likely to be deficient in meeting future demands. 
2. Strategic 
Strategically, the close proximity of both domestic ports has inherent 
vulnerabilities, making them and Pakistan more susceptible to a naval blockade. 
The need for an alternate port became apparent soon after the 1971 war when 
the Karachi port complex came under Indian missile attack. The Gwadar port, 
460 kilometers away from Karachi, will serve as an alternate port to handle 
Pakistani trade in case of an emergency or the blockade of existing ports.46  
3. Regional 
The decision to build a port at Gwadar came twenty-five years after an 
initial proposal to build a port along the Makran Coast. Gwadar is strategically 
located on the Indian Ocean at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central 
Asia, both regions that are rich in natural resources. The geographic location in 
proximity to the crucial trade from the Persian Gulf and the largely untapped 
resources of Central Asia has bestowed upon Pakistan one of the vital export 
corridors in the region.   
D. GWADAR PORT 
With a population of 125,000, Gwadar is now set on its way to become a 
hub of shipping, commercial and industrial activities. The construction work at the 
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port started on March 22, 2002. The work on the first phase of this mega project, 
constructed by Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, is already complete. For 
this phase, out of a total cost of $248 million, China has provided $198 million 
U.while Pakistan provided $50 million.47  
1. Scope of Work 
The development of Gwadar port is being undertaken in two phases.  
These two phases are shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Phases I & II of Gwadar Port48  
a. Phase-I49  
This phase includes construction of three berths, with a depth of 
12.5 meters, and approach channels. On commissioning, these three berths will 
be used for the loading and unloading of general cargo that may come from as 
                                            





far away as West China, Europe and the American continents. In the first phase, 
the 602 meter long quay or jetty will handle up to 50,000 Deadweight Tonnage 
(DWT) container carriers. The designed annual throughput of the three multi-
purpose berths is 100,000 TEUs of containers, 270,000 tons of general cargo 
and 450,000 tons of bulk cargo.  
b. Phase–II50  
Phase-II will be developed through the private sector on a Built 
Operate Transfer (BOT) and Built Operate Own (BOO) basis. Its extension work 
includes nine berths, including two container terminals, two dry bulk terminals, 
two oil terminals, one roll-on-roll-off terminal, one bulk cargo terminal, one 
general cargo terminal and a channel dredged to 20.0 meters in depth with allied 
port facilities. The government has started negotiations with local and foreign 
companies to develop this phase at a cost of $524 million. Gwadar Port, after the 
completion of phase-II, will have the capacity to handle vessels up to 100,000 
DWT for cargo and vessels up to 200,000 DWT for oil. 
2. Port Associated Infrastructure 
While construction work on the port building is going on, a whole set of 
supporting infrastructure facilities are being laid down, as indicated in Figure 451. 
The government has already established a Gwadar Development Authority that 
operates closely with the Gwadar Port Authority and other government agencies 
to synergize the completion of this mega project. 
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Figure 4.   Gwadar Master Plan  
 
a. Transportation Links 
The Makran Coastal Highway linking Gwadar with Karachi on a 675 
mile stretch is going to be the lifeline of the Gwadar project. Completion of this 
highway will open up the area for business opportunities to domestic as well as 
international investors. It will also link Karachi with Iran, and thus open a new and 





Figure 5.   Road Network from Gwadar  
 
The Asian Development Bank has already provided U.S. $500 
million to building road projects, linking Pakistan’s Balochistan and Frontier 
provinces with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Road projects are, however, hitting 
snags due to the persistent instability in Afghanistan and the disturbed internal 
dynamics of Pakistan. There are also plans to lay a comprehensive rail link, 





b. Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline52 
The long dormant project of a 1,500 kilometer long Trans-Afghan 
Gas Pipeline (TAP) from Turkmenistan to Gwadar and other parts of Pakistan 
that hopes to pump Turkmen natural gas to global markets is also poised to step 
off the drawing board after completion of the port project.  This proposed pipeline 
is shown in Figure 6. 
 
  
Figure 6.   Proposed Gas & Oil Pipeline  
 
c. Upgradation of the Gwadar Airport 
Gwadar presently has a small airport that is basically meant for 
small Fokker aircraft. Its expansion is already in full swing, aimed at a facility 
capable of accommodating all major airlines. Oman has provided a grant of $7 
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million for this upgrade, and additionally, Rs. 563.35 million is being provided by 
the Pakistan government and the Civil Aviation Authority for this purpose.  
d. Civic Amenities 
Gwadar city is being contemplated as a replica of Dubai city. The 
Gwadar master plan calls for all the amenities characteristic of a modern city and 
developmental work is already underway to ensure that the necessary facilities 
are made available to establish the requisite business and housing needs. 
E. THE COMPETING PORTS  
1. Dubai Ports53  
The Dubai Port Authority is presently handling two major ports, Rashid 
and Jebel Ali. The Rashid port has established itself as a world-class trans-
shipment hub serving as a load center for markets in the Gulf. In March 2002, the 
Dubai Port Authority started construction of another port at Jebel Ali, which 
raised the port’s capacity to 5.7 million TEU. Jebel Ali port is the largest man-
made port. The port’s trans-shipment flows were estimated at a total of four 
million TEUs in 2002.54  
2. Salalah Port of Oman55 
This is a relatively new trans-shipment hub on the Arabian Sea, which 
established itself as a container terminal in November 1998. Its major advantage 
is its proximity to the Europe/Asia trunk line route. It requires little diversion by 
line haul ships, allowing a quick pit stop to pick up and drop off containers for the 
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Arabian Peninsula, Indian and Pakistani markets. The Salalah port’s current 
throughput is estimated at 1.2 million TEUs.56  
3. Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar Ports of Iran  
The Bandar Abbas port possesses twenty-four berths, including two oil 
berths. The approach channel of Bandar Abbas (Shahid Rajaee) port is 6.4 
kilometers long and thirteen meters deep57. 
Iran plans to upgrade facilities in Bandar Abbas to a 2.6 million TEU 
capacity. The port is already connected by weekly container block trains to 
Tashkent (Uzbekistan) in Central Asia. The Chahbahar port has two main jetties, 
which can host only five vessels of up to 25,000 gross tonnage and draft of 
eleven meters. 
4. Domestic Ports of Karachi and Qasim 
Karachi, being the main port of Pakistan, handles over fourteen million 
tons of liquid and twelve million tons of dry cargo. Port Qasim is merely fifty-six 
kilometers east of Karachi and may be considered an extension of the Karachi 
port complex. Karachi had been known as the gateway to Asia for a very long 
time58; however, it could not translate its strategic location into a regional hub 
due to the lack of domestic trade and the disturbed geopolitical situation of the 
area surrounding Pakistan.  
F. COMPARISON OF PORTS 
Dubai, Jebel Ali and Salalah ports are well-established hub ports. Dubai’s 
trade accounts for 16.5 percent of a $20 billion economy of the UAE, and all of 
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these ports contribute significantly in the income.59 After just over four years of its 
establishment, Salalah port earned above $58 million through the trans-shipment 
business.60 The present cargo handling capacities of Qasim and Karachi ports 
are seventeen million and twenty-five million tons per annum, respectively, and 
are reaching their capacity.61 As far as Iran is concerned, both ports do not have 
enough capacity to handle the flow of natural resources from Central Asia. 
Moreover, the international isolation of Iran hampers port operation, as it is not 
open to international users.  
The presence of geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East and bottlenecks 
of capacity in the case of domestic ports will provide an opportunity for Gwadar 
port to attract a sizable share of the market, and hence establish itself as a hub.  
G. INTERESTS, INTERRELATION & CONFLICTS OF REGIONAL AND 
EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS 
1. Pakistan’s Interests in the Region 
Pakistan has a strategic location in the Indian Ocean region. On the west 
is Iran, which has traditionally been a close ally. On the east is India, which is 
seen as a potential adversary. In the north is China, which has been a close 
friend. To the northwest is Afghanistan, which is likely to become increasingly 
friendly towards Pakistan because of her geo-economic necessities. However, 
recent years have seen bitterness between the relations of the two countries due 
to placing of the blame on one another for controlling the remnants of the 
Taliban. Meanwhile, Pakistan is also located strategically in the vicinity of the 
Persian Gulf and acquires a special significance as nearly seventeen million 
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barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily.62 About 90 percent of 
Pakistan’s trade is sea-borne and its SLOCs are passing through the Indian 
Ocean.63 Development of a commercial port at Gwadar on the northern 
extremities is another important factor for Pakistan’s interest in the region.  
The importance of the coast of Balochistan was realized by the CIA in the 
1980s citing “its strategic location near oil routes from the Persian Gulf.”64 For a 
long time the Soviet Union, prior to its breakup, desired expansion toward the 
warm waters of the Arabian Sea.65 Pakistan and Iran had also long believed that 
the U.S.S.R. hoped to gain warm water ports, and the same objective is 
manifested in assessments of the CIA.66  
In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
the political map of the region is being reshaped and new political trends are 
emerging. The United States, China and India are flexing their muscles to 
enhance their influence in the area. The relationship between the United States 
and Pakistan has been like a roller-coaster ride, marked by alliance and close 
partnership during the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan Administrations and cool 
or tense relations when Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton occupied the 
White House.67 This long and checkered relationship has its roots in the Cold  
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War and South Asian regional politics of the 1950s.68 After 9/11, the dictates of 
the GWOT have once again brought Pakistan back in the camp of the United 
States. 
In the recent past, India and Pakistan have entered into a “composite 
dialogue” and there is a reasonable optimism that even if long-standing disputes 
like Kashmir and Siachen are not resolved, a working relationship could be 
established for the collective good. Iran, India and Pakistan are working closely 
to strike a deal over a gas and oil pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan. 
Indian and Pakistani authorities are also endeavoring to materialize the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline, which would terminate in 
India and would go even beyond.  
Thus, optimism exists to foster economic cooperation amongst all 
concerned states, and the Gwadar port can provide common ground in this 
regard. Interest and response of the United States in the port project will have far 
reaching affects in both its operationalization as well as the stabilization of the 
strategic situation in the area. 
2. United States’ Interests 
Although the termination of the Cold War ended a pretext for a heavy U.S. 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, American policy makers were still “preparing 
for two major theater wars (MTWs) in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.”69 
That is why, in May 1997, in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy 
retained its twelve Carrier Battle Groups and twelve Amphibious Ready Groups  
(ARGs). The United States has an interest in keeping the oceans open to all, 
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which is evident from the presence of, at the minimum, the U.S. Middle East 
Force in the Persian Gulf since 1949.70 
In the Middle East the United States’ main ally, Saudi Arabia, traditionally 
a mainstay of U.S. policy, has 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (more 
than one-fourth of the world total), and up to one trillion barrels of ultimately 
recoverable oil.71 Shortly after the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, the United 
States (and other Western countries) created the Strategic Petroleum Reserves 
(SPR) as the nation’s first line of defense in case of an oil crisis. In November 
2001, President Bush made an unprecedented decision to fill the SPR to its full 
capacity of 700 million barrels.72 As of July 2007, the United States imported 62 
percent of its oil requirements in 2006, out of which 39 percent came from the 
Persian Gulf region.73 The United States’ economic prosperity and strategic 
security, therefore, depends on an uninterrupted supply of oil. 
The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas are likely to remain a high 
priority of United States policy makers for the foreseeable future. Naval presence 
is likely to increase even further due to increased turmoil in Middle Eastern 
countries and the declining acceptance of U.S. ground forces. This presence will 
have a direct bearing on the Gwadar port project, and it ought to have positive 
effects.  The Indian Ocean region has remained and will be an area of interest for 
the American policy makers. It is, however, a well recognized fact that the United 
States helps to “shape the environment” (in the words of the Pentagon’s 
Quadrennial Defense Review) in various regions.74 Pakistan does need that help 
to ensure success of its port project. Notwithstanding internal dynamics, which 
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are pushing policies, overall economic and strategic interests ought to drive the 
United States to foster cooperation amongst states of the region. The United 
States’ fostered stabilization in the area hopefully will guarantee the success of 
the Gwadar port project, and Islamabad needs to formulate policies that can 
attract such support. China, being an emerging power and the largest 
stakeholder in the port project, has an equally important role.  
3. Chinese Interests  
China is an emerging global player with significant influence in the area as 
it is the only great power that is contiguous to South Asia. One estimate suggests 
that, with the present remarkable growth rate, it is expected to become the 
world’s largest economy, overthrowing the United States by 2020.75 China’s 
desire to play an important role in the Indian Ocean stems from its historical 
association with the region and the presence of her vital sea trade routes in the 
area. Its long-term interests in the Indian Ocean are both economic and politico-
strategic. Chinese government concerns about energy security in an oil import 
era, however, continue to dominate its strategic thinking.76 
For China, South Asia, West Asia, Africa and even Europe through the 
Indian Ocean are closer than the U.S. west coast across the Pacific.77 At 
present, China is not in a position to interfere effectively in the Indian Ocean, yet 
owing to her growing navy and her interests she can exercise considerable 
influence in the region. In the present unipolar environment, China wants to take 
the role of a major participant in the establishment of a new type of world order. 
This cannot be achieved with having the Indian Ocean region out of her 
influence.78 Similarly, China also resents the hegemonic designs of India towards 
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the Indian Ocean, and has always exhibited her opposition to such Indian 
presumptions. China also suspects India of supporting superpower presence in 
the Indian Ocean as a means of countering China. The most serious challenge 
for China is that the U.S. military presence in Central, South and South-East Asia 
may undermine Chinese influence in these regions and make it more difficult for 
China to achieve its security, economic and energy objectives in the future.79 
China has already consolidated its access to the Indian Ocean through the 
Karakoram Highway and Karachi and Gwadar ports, through the China-Burma 
road to Burmese ports, and through the Malacca Straits. For China, the second 
stake holder in the Gwadar port project, the port offers a strategic toehold in the 
energy rich region of CARs (Central Asian Republics) and provides an alternative 
trade link to its western provinces. Xinjiang Province lies 4,500 kilometers from 
China’s east coast but just 2,500 kilometers from Gwadar. This will make it 
possible for China to route some of its external trade through the Gwadar port.  
International relations theorists suggest that as a nation becomes more 
prosperous and more integrated into the world economy, it will become more 
democratized and more anxious to preserve the world order that has made its 
prosperity possible. It is therefore envisaged that the Chinese would not venture 
into a military presence in the name of safe-guarding interests at the Gwadar 
Port, and stir up a never-ending spiral of seriously destabilizing events. Pakistan 
will have to ensure appropriate policies to dispel any such contemplation by 
Beijing.  
4. Iranian Interests  
The Persian Gulf is an important trade route in the strategic northern 
reaches of the Indian Ocean. Some 80 percent of the world’s oil tankers leave 
                                            
79 Nan Li, “11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges and War Fighting,” Working 
Paper No. 32, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (September 2002). 
 62
the shores of the Persian Gulf destined to other parts of the world.80 The 
geopolitical location of Iran within the Persian Gulf region is such that the 
northern shores of this Gulf belong entirely to Iran, which enables her to control 
the Straight of Hormuz. Passage through Hormuz is an issue of concern several 
times a year when Iran holds its war games at the mouth of Gulf.81 Iran regards 
her role in the Indian Ocean as an extension of her interests in the Gulf.  
Iran, too, is concerned with her economic interests associated with the 
Indian Ocean. The supply of natural gas to India, via a pipeline through the 
Indian Ocean, is one of Iran’s mega projects. Additionally, the Iranian port of 
Chahbahar, located on the mouth of Gulf, could become the hub of commercial 
activities if the natural resources of CAR find the way to the rest of the world 
through this port. Iran’s situation with respect to its influence on the CARs and its 
desire to mend fences with the West suffer many impediments.  
Turkmenistan sees Iran as one of the potential export routes for both oil 
and gas; even many of the oil tycoons see it as a viable option; but the United 
States is pushing hard for alternative routes.82 Washington advocates the 
construction of pipelines in several directions from the Caspian Region, explicitly 
excluding Iran.83 Although Iran has seen some investment from the E.U. 
(particularly France) and India, it largely remains isolated from the international 
monetary system. Its isolation thus enhances prospects of Gwadar port success.  
5. Indian Interests 
India is perhaps the only country on the Indian Ocean that has the 
economic potential, military strength and the political will to dominate this vast 
                                            
80 Danesh Pajooh, “Iran and the Strategic Significance of the Persian Gulf,” in Indian Ocean 
Security and Stability in the Post-Cold War Era (Islamabad: The Directorate of Naval Educational 
Services, 1995), 223. 
81 Donna J. Nincic, “Sea Lane Security and US Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce 
Resources,” in Sam J. Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 2002), 157.  
82 “Caspian Energy.” 
83 “The Geo-Politics of Caspian Oil,” The Janes Intelligence Review, (July 1, 2000). 
 63
expanse of water.84 Indian leaders and strategists have traditionally viewed the 
Indian Ocean region as a sort of Indian security zone, very loosely akin to the 
way Americans have viewed Central America and the Caribbean. Although 
Indian leaders have not explicitly laid out such a regional doctrine, Indian 
behavior in the Indian Ocean has generally conformed to such and implicit 
doctrine.85 
India’s dominant physical features and geographical location in the Indian 
Ocean indicate its dependence on the sea for both prosperity and security. India 
does not have any significant land access to the rest of world. Hostility with 
Pakistan and a difficult geography that separates India from China and Burma 
dictates that over 97 percent of India’s trade is done through the Indian Ocean; 
therefore, India has critical interests in maintaining the openness of the Indian 
Ocean route. India depends, to a large extent, on the import of crude oil and 
petroleum products from the Persian Gulf region. India’s production from existing 
oil fields has been declining over time, increasing its dependence on the import 
of oil.86 Nearly 60 percent of the Indian petroleum requirements87 are met 
through the imported oil.88 India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas predicts 
the country’s demand for petroleum products will jump to 155.3 million metric 
tons per year (3.106 million barrels per day) by fiscal year 2007-08.89 To meet 
additional energy requirements, India seeks to develop economic relation with 
CARs in collaboration with Iran, and desires to have access to this market. For 
this reason, since the 1990s Central Asia has come to represent India’s extended 
neighborhood. For India, Caspian energy supplies have a critical strategic 
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drawback in that they must transit Pakistan, with whom relations are continually 
strained over the disputed territory of Kashmir.90 
There are up to thirty Indian ships at sea in Indian waters at any given 
time and a much larger number of ships of other nations engaged in trade to and 
from Indian ports,91 in addition to 8-10 tankers carrying crude oil to India daily.92 
India is working on the strategy of building up a viable maritime (naval) force to 
deter any potential aggressor and to protect her SLOCs. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in 
his book The Paradox of American Power, writes that India’s military capabilities 
are impressive in South Asia but not in the larger Asian context.93 However, its 
strategic interests extend way beyond that and are even pretentious of the 
domain of regional hegemony, factors which dictate her relations with other 
countries. 
6. Afghanistan’s Interests  
Afghanistan has historically remained the center of contention between 
major powers. History knows one such struggle for mastery in Central Asia 
between Russia and Great Britain as “the Great Game.”94 Russia again ventured 
into Afghanistan towards the last decades of 20th century, attracting U.S. 
attention at a time when it was looking for suitable opportunity to undo some of 
the unpleasant memories of Vietnam. This Russian venture ended when, at a 
Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, the Soviet leaders decided to withdraw 
troops from Afghanistan by the end of 1988.95 Hopes of building war-torn 
Afghanistan faded sooner than expected due to internal strife generated by 
warlords. The Taliban then came along to fill the leadership gap, until displaced 
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in 2001. Afghanistan is currently in a state of war and nation building, and it is too 
soon to foresee how things will settle down in the long run.96  
Afghanistan lacks a functional economy of any significance. Its agrarian 
based subsistence economy is not even meeting the basic food requirements of 
Afghans, forcing the population to survive on foreign donated food. The donors 
that participated in the Tokyo Conference of January 2002 pledged over U.S. 
$4.5 billion to Afghanistan over five years. The World Bank has estimated that 
the requirement of a fund for addressing basic Afghan problems to be around 
U.S. $10.2 billion over five years. Based on two years of reconstruction 
experience, in July 2003, Care International estimated the requirement for funds 
to be between U.S. $15-30 billion over a five-year period.97 Gwadar port stands a 
bright chance of playing an active role in the entire reconstruction exercise.  
Amongst other projects, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) 
pipeline is hoped to help revive the Afghan economy. The TAP pipeline project 
could prove to be a jackpot for the people of Afghanistan as the project could 
bring in over $300 million as royalty to the country.98 The inflow of this cash and 
foreign investments may help in stabilizing the country’s economy and in 
reconstructing its infrastructure. It can be argued that a pro-U.S. regime in 
Afghanistan will be conducive to the involvement of U.S. firms in the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.99 Afghan transit trade was earlier 
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will handle it. Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani also offered his country’s 
support for the development of the Gwadar port, saying it would act as a gateway 
to prosperity for the entire region.100  
7. Japanese Interests  
The importance of the Indian Ocean to the Japanese cannot be 
exaggerated; it would not be wrong to state that the Indian Ocean is a lifeline of 
Japan. Japan averaged 3.9 million barrels per day of net oil imports from the 
Persian Gulf during 2002.101 The need to protect her economic interest may one 
day invoke deeper involvement of her “Self Defense Maritime Forces.”102 Japan 
presently relies on the forces of the United States and other Western powers for 
her protection. Japan has no overt political goal in this region and, with its heavy 
dependence on this region for raw material and oil, the Japanese have always 
desired peace here. Japan’s energy concerns dictate its policies in favor of oil 
from a Caspian export pipeline terminating at the Indian Ocean.103 Therefore, it is 
safe to assume that Japan will support the operationalization of the Gwadar port 
project. 
8. European Union Interests  
Western Europe averaged 2.3 million bbl/d (barrels per day) of oil imports 
from the Persian Gulf during 2002.104 E.U. members possess only about 0.6 
percent of the world’s proven reserves of oil and 2.0 percent of the world’s 
natural gas, and it is estimated that two-thirds of the E.U.’s total energy 
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requirements will be imported by 2020.105 The E.U. is, therefore, heavily 
dependent on oil transiting through the Indian Ocean. By and large their policy 
towards the Indian Ocean region has been one of reconciliation and resolution of 
security issues through the use of “soft power.”106 Their dependence on oil, 
guarded by the U.S. Navy, has not encouraged them to seek an active role in the 
problems of either the Middle East or South Asia. 
Nevertheless, a strong desire exists amongst European nations to have 
access to alternate oil resources, reducing their vulnerability to a single area 
source. Like all others, CARs attracted the E.U.’s attention and it strongly 
supports an oil and gas pipeline from CARs to the E.U. through Turkey. The 
pipeline route to European markets through Georgia and Turkey faces 
geopolitical turmoil and tough hurdles in its realization and actual execution. 
Separatist tensions in Georgia, instability in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, and 
unrest over Cyprus near the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan are some of 
the problems.107 In this scenario, the E.U. is likely to support a pipeline to the 
Indian Ocean either through Iran or Pakistan. There is negligible evidence of 
negative trends in E.U. relations with states that matter to the Gwadar port 
project. The E.U. and China have developed a stable relationship over the last 
decade, and so far they do not seem worried about a Chinese presence in the 
Indian Ocean. 
H. SOME OTHER PROJECTS IN BALOCHISTAN 
Beside Gwadar port, some of the other projects being undertaken by the 
Pakistan government in the province are as follows. 
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1. The Mirani Dam Project  
The construction work of the Mirani Dam has been completed and was 
inaugurated by the president of Pakistan in November 2006.108 The Mirani Dam 
in the Kech area of the Makran district, with a catchments area of 12,000 square 
kilometers, has been built at a cost of Rs 6 billion, including Rs 1.5 billion paid in 
compensation to the affected people. It will have a storage capacity of over 
300,000 million acre-feet of water. The project was launched in 2002 and will 
result in a general social uplift of the project area. About 32,000 people of more 
than 4,400 families will benefit.109 
2. The Saindak Project 
The discovery of copper deposits at Saindak was made in the 1970s in 
collaboration with a Chinese engineering firm. The Saindak copper-gold project 
was set up by Saindak Metals Ltd. (SML), a company wholly owned by the 
government of Pakistan, by the end of 1995 at a cost of Rs 13.5 billion.  
The Saindak project was based on estimated ore reserves of 412 million 
tons containing on average 0.5 gram of gold per ton and 1.5 grams of silver per 
ton. The mine is reported to have produced about 50,000 tons since October 
2003.110 According to official estimates, the project has the capacity to produce 
15,800 tons of blister copper annually, containing 1.5 tons of gold and 2.8 tons of 
silver. The reported production results, however, have generally remained on 
average more than 2,000 tons per month, which means that more than 
production of 24,000 tons per year has been taking place. 
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3. The Livestock Development Strategy 
The Balochistan government has prepared a rangeland development 
program designed to support about 50 percent of the total livestock population of 
Pakistan and provide 90 per cent of the forage requirements for Balochistan 
livestock.111 
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO DEVELOPMENT 
There are many reasons for the economic backwardness of the province. 
Some of these are listed below. 
1. Governance/Institutional Framework 
Institutional inefficiency among government departments has been one of 
the major reasons for slow development in the province.  
2. Water Shortage 
This is one of the major problems of Balochistan. There are very few 
canals to take the province’s share of water from the River Indus. 
3. Tribal Culture 
There is in fact a parallel government within the country. The individuals 
are more loyal to the tribal chief than to the government. For example, the share 
of royalties for oil and gas is paid to tribal chiefs instead of equal disbursement 
among the populace.  
4. The Law-and-Order Situation 
The negative influence of tribal chiefs is also a great hurdle in the way of 
the creation of a positive investment culture as well as development projects.   
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J. THE PATTERN OF INSURGENT ACTIVITIES 
The general pattern of militant activities is not yet very clear. However, 
some of the features are as follows.  
1. Use of Latest Equipment 
Militants are using the latest equipment for target acquisition, surveillance 
and communications apart from traditional methods. 
2. Organization/Stage of Insurgency 
The militants are generally organized into cells of 6-20 personnel capable 
of merging into the local population. The cells are controlled by overall regional 
commanders. From the organization pattern, it is evident that the militant 
movement is somewhere between the organization and active resistance stages 
of insurgency. 
3. Use of Media 
This is a new development in the Balochistan scenario. Militant elements 
are actively utilizing media to further their cause. Newspapers, pamphlets, radio 
transmission and internet websites are being utilized to influence the minds of the 
people. 
K. CAUSES OF UNREST 
Balochistan is once again in a state of unrest, and has been for the last 
three years. The major causes are described below. 
1. Minerals Royalty Issue 
As previously noted, Balochistan is blessed with huge natural resources 
but any royalty generated here only goes to tribal Sardars. These Sardars have 
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been blackmailing the government to increase the royalty and the allied perks. 
The issue has been portrayed as exploitation of Baloch resources by Punjab.  
2. Attacks on National Assets and Frontier Corps 
These actions, besides challenging the writ of the state, have also caused 
considerable damage to the national assets. 
3. Inter- and Intra-Tribal Rivalries 
Tribal rivalries have also made the law-and-order situation in the province 
more complex by obscuring the line between anti-government actions and tribal 
enmities.  
4. Army Cantonments 
Nationalist elements are worried by plans to build more military 
cantonments at Gwadar, Kohlu and Dera Bugti.112 They see these as evidence 
of the federal government’s plan to break their grip over the unlawful and 
unchecked authority. 
5. Mega Development Projects 
Mega development projects are being opposed by the nationalists on the 
following accounts.  
a. Demographic Change 
The Sardars follow the contention that these projects will change 
the demography of the province.113 It is likely that Gwadar will hasten the arrival 
of two million people.114 
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b. Threat to the Feudal System 
The economic prosperity in the province will raise awareness 
amongst the masses and weaken the feudal hold. Thus, development projects 
remain a threat to the feudal system in the long run. 
c. Miscellaneous 
• Gross neglect of development in Balochistan by successive 
governments. 
• Unchecked smuggling of narcotics, arms and ammunition. 
• Absence of mature and enterprising local media, which increases 
frustration and exploitation of the masses by pro-active nationalists. 
6. The Political Situation 
The weak political government in Balochistan is unable to establish writ 
over the province due to friction between various parties included in the coalition 
government. 
The nationalists, having been left out of the power game and after 
suffering defeat in the general elections, are apprehensive of their future in 
politics. Hence, they are trying to portray certainissues as anti-Baloch, mainly to 
gather public support. 
L. THE POSSIBILITY OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT 
Owing to changing geo-political and geo-economic environments, some of 
the regional countries have developed interest in Balochistan. The major players 
include India, Afghanistan and Russia. 
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1. India 
The Indian motives include the following:  
• Economic Goals. India wants to pursue her economic goals by 
using the port of Chah Behar and undermining Pakistan’s economy 
by not allowing development of Gwadar. 
• Safeguarding her Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). The 
strategic location of Gwadar affords an opportunity to the Pakistani 
Navy to effectively interfere with Indian SLOCs. 
2. Afghanistan 
The issue of borders and Pashtoon Khawa has been a cause of ups and 
downs in bilateral relations. Specifically, the problemscan be broken down into 
the following areas. 
a. The Durand Line Issue 
Afghanistan opposed the membership of Pakistan to the UNO 
(United Nations Organization). This act was followed by the convening of ‘Loya 
Jirga’ on July 26, 1949 in Kabul, which declared the Durand Line agreement null 
and void.  
b. Support of Baloch Insurgencies 
Owing to the interest as mentioned earlier, Afghanistan supported 
the insurgencies of 1958 and 1973. The insurgents were given refuge in 
Afghanistan. 
c. The Russo Afghan War 
The war resulted in the influx of Afghan refugees into NWFP and 
Balochistan. This influx tilted the demographic balance in the province. 
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d. The Stance of the Present Afghan Government 
There has been no direct involvement in Balochistan affairs by the  
Afghan government. However, there might be some involvement of some power 
groups, such as Taliban, Indian and Iranian elements, which have their influence 
in Afghanistan.  
3. Russia 
Balochistan has been important to Russia in the past. Russia had plans to 
control the supply of Gulf oil through the capture of Balochistan. During the 
Afghan war, there were connections between Russia and Baloch nationalist 
leaders, but at that time the Soviet Union was hesitant115 to make such an overt 
move by contributing substantial aid to the Baloch resistance movement. 
However, the desire of Pakistan to access Central Asian States (CARs) is at 
odds with the Russian interests. If the Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline project 
succeeds, it would negatively affect the Russian economy. The Russian 
economy, in its present form, is based on the monopoly of Gazprom (a state 
owned gas company) and if Gazprom goes under, the Russian economy will be 
severely affected. Therefore, Russian re-establishment of ties with the Baloch 
nationalists cannot be ruled out.  
M. NATIONALIST’S DEMANDS 
The nationalists asserted that the denial of power to the provincial 
government in order to control their natural resources is the root cause of 
differences with the federal government. A few of their important demands and 
reservations are listed below.116 
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1. Pakistan’s System of Governance 
• The country should be run according to the spirit of the Federal 
Parliamentary System. The National Assembly should be abolished 
and all of its regulatory and legislative powers should be shifted to 
the provincial assemblies and the Senate.  
• The National Reconstruction Bureau has decentralized 30% of 
provincial government functions and powers to district governments 
out of total existing 32%, but is silent on decentralizing the functions 
and powers of federal government. 
• The federal government should look after only three subjects: 
currency, defense and foreign affairs. 
• Increase in minerals royalty for Balochistan. 
• The criteria for distribution of National Finance Commission Award 
should also cater for population density, poverty and backwardness 
of the area, in addition to the criteria of population. 
2. Provincial Government Jurisdiction 
• Natural resources, ports, shipping and security should be controlled 
by the provincial government.  
• The business initiatives in the province should be handled by the 
Balochistan Chamber of Commerce, as it is a provincial subject.  
• The provincial government should be allowed to make direct 
economic ventures with foreign investors. 
• The government should not generate any new mega project without 
involving a Baloch representative. 
• Control of all mineral and gas installations should be handed over 
to the Balochistan provincial government. 
• Financial accounts should be controlled, monitored and audited by 
the provincial government only. 
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3. Security Concerns 
• Construction of new military cantonments in Balochistan should be 
stopped forthwith.  
• No military action should be taken in the province.  
• The security system of the province needs to be built according to 
the aspirations of Balochistan. 
• The merger of the Balochistan Levies into the Balochistan Police 
Force should be repealed. 
4. Gwadar 
• Control of Gwadar should be given to the Balochistan provincial 
government. 
• Gwadar Deep Sea Port Authority should be shifted from Karachi to 
Gwadar. 
• Construction work of the second phase of Gwadar port should be 
dropped. 
• Lands allotted to non-locals under housing schemes should be 
cancelled, especially in Gwadar. 
• All non-Baloch’s doing business in Gwadar must not be allowed the 
right to vote in any elections held in Gwadar. 
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VII. INFORMATION OPERATIONS DOMAIN/TOOLS TO 
COUNTER A SITUATION LIKE BALOCHISTAN 
A. PREMISE 
We are living in an age where every possible field of human life and 
activity is dominated by information. The scenarios and related information 
around us are changing at an extremely rapid pace. The advancement of 
technology to quickly process and disseminate raw data into useful/meaningful 
information in an appropriate manner to the concerned quarters has forced the 
decision makers not only to know the information related to the adversary, but to 
protect their own information. This phenomenon has also necessitated 
incorporating the Information Operations (IO) tools in the conventional planning 
and execution of tasks both during peace time as well as amidst the stressful and 
volatile situation of conflicts. Failure to do this in a timely and appropriate manner 
may result in adverse consequences, both militarily and politically. Unfortunately, 
there is less emphasis and understanding among some conventional military 
commanders about the fact that if the IO tools are employed in the true sense, 
with deliberate vision and strategic understanding well before and even during 
any conflict or campaign, it can not only be cost-effective for the impending 
campaign, but it can ensure achievement of desired results with minimum loss of 
time and effort.117 A significant problem surfaces when we fail to adequately 
integrate IO with military operations. So, the obvious question arises: why do we 
fail to integrate the IO tools and guidelines into conventional planning?  
B. DIFFICULTY IN INTEGRATING IO 
There are essentially three issues which must be considered in order to 
integrate IO with military operations. These are: IO doctrine, intelligence support 
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to IO, and resourcing the IO efforts.118 First, in most of the cases, the military 
doctrine of various countries does not provide military commanders adequate 
guidance for integrating IO into their operations. Doctrine presents IO in a 
disjointed manner and as a function that is essentially separate from the 
commander’s other requirements and missions, not as something that must be 
integrated into all his requirements and missions. Second, IO requires proper 
intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do 
not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective. Intelligence doctrine provides 
little practical guidance on support to IO and intelligence processors and analysts 
are currently unprepared to provide the in-depth analysis of the information 
environment IO requires. Third, most militaries have not resource themselves to 
conduct IO in an effective manner. Due to the combined effect of all of this, the 
information mechanism fails to adequately portray the information environment. 
Also, it hinders the activities through which commanders can process the 
reporting that would allow them to analyze and portray the information 
environment. Professional Military Education and unit training programs do not 
stress IO as an integrated function and do not present commanders with realistic 
situations in which they may achieve success in the information environment. As 
a result of these three issues, commanders just do not understand how to 
integrate IO. 
C. WHAT ARE IO AND IW? 
Before getting into the business of Information Operations and Information 
Warfare it is appropriate to discuss what information actually is. As per the 
definition in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and associated 
terms, the definition of Information is, “Facts, data, or instructions in any medium 
or form. Information also refers to the meaning that a human assigns to data by 
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means of the known conventions used in their representation.”119 Here the 
important element is that information obtained from any medium, once the 
cognitive filters are applied to it by human beings, starts carrying some 
meanings. These meanings are bound to be related to the type of cognitive filter 
applied as well as the quality of that filter. So, it is very likely that the same 
information may convey different meanings to different persons as per their 
previous knowledge, background, and prevailing environments in which context 
the information has been obtained and interpreted.  The cycle of raw data from 
different sensors and sources of information becoming knowledge is depicted in 
the Figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 7.   The Process of Raw Data Becoming Knowledge. 
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1. Information Operations (IO) 
Information Operations (IO), specifically in the military context, are 
described as integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer 
network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception 
(MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting 
and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human 
and automated decision making while protecting our own.120 These elements of 
military operations are mostly associated with the Information Operations as 
defined by the DoD. 
A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority. 
Thomas Rona, an early proponent of Information Warfare, offered the following 
definition:  
The strategic, operation, and tactical level competitions across the 
spectrum of peace, crisis, crisis escalation, conflict, war, war 
termination, and reconstitution/restoration, waged between 
competitors, adversaries or enemies using information means to 
achieve their objectives.121 
2. Information Warfare (IW) 
Defining Information Warfare is a difficult and formidable task. A RAND 
study suggested that IW is evolving rapidly in response to the information 
revolution, therefore the definition is mostly imprecise. In fact the defense 
Science Board observed that, “we lack a common vocabulary.” One U.S. Air 
Force Chief of Staff, General Fogelman, viewed IW as, “The fifth dimension of 
warfare.” Martin Libicki reports that some of the definitions of IW were so broad 
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that they appeared to “cover all human endeavors.”122 So, it appears that 
everyone has twisted the parameters of IW as per their own convenience and 
understanding.  
IW is the use of information, or information systems, to disrupt or destroy 
an organization perceived to be an enemy. The over-riding objective is to coerce 
the target to act in a way that is favorable to the attacker’s wishes and overall 
plan. The use of information to gain advantage over an adversary is not new; 
however, the magnitude of the impact of these tactics has increased in this 
information age. Society as a whole is feeling the impact and accompanying 
massive changes as information increasingly becomes a source of power, 
influence, and economic gain. There are a number of definitions available, which 
describe the term IO in various manners. There seems to be conflicting views 
about this term among the scholars and warfare experts. One such definition is, 
“the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict 
to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries.”123 Here it should be clarified that not everyone agrees that 
Information Warfare is limited to the realm of traditional warfare.  
An interesting development took place when DoD decided to abandon the 
term IW (Information Warfare). In Joint Publication 3-13, “Information 
Operations,” of February 2006, the term IW was removed from the IO doctrine. 
Nevertheless, it is staying on and is frequently used to mention a specific portion 
of IO. 
Warfare at the information level may take on several possible forms and 
manifestations.124 Numerous authors have described the future shape of 
Information Warfare related to different layers of human society. One very well 
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respected piece in this domain is Cyber War is Coming by Professor John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, where they have described it in four different 
categories: Net warfare, Political warfare, Economical warfare, and Cyber 
warfare.125 Their observations and conclusions are based on the expanded 
global development of information infrastructures.   
D. OVERALL IO PERSPECTIVE (UNITED STATES) 
1. The Information Environment 
The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 
information.126 The actors include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and 
organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect, 
analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is 
one in which humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act 
upon information, and it is therefore the principal environment of decision 
making. Even though the information environment is considered distinct, it 
resides within each of the four domains. The information environment is made up 
of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive.  
a. The Physical Dimension127 
The physical dimension is composed of the command and control 
(C2) systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and 
organizations to conduct operations. In Pakistan, this dimension has been further 
augmented and given the name of C4I2SR, which stands for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, IO, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance. Under this umbrella, all the related activities are also covered.  
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It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications 
networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, 
infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively, the 
elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently 
combat. Power has traditionally been measured primarily in this dimension. 
b. The Informational Dimension128 
The informational dimension is where information is collected, 
processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension 
where the C2 of modern military forces is communicated, and where the 
commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of 
information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must be 
protected. If the information is breached in this stage, the overall effectiveness of 
any impending operation is degraded to a greater extent. In Pakistan, this 
dimension is mostly looked after by the respective services intelligence set-ups 
under the umbrella of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) directorate. 
c. The Cognitive Dimension129 
The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision 
maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think, 
perceive, visualize, and decide. The SPD (Strategic Planning Division) in 
Pakistan, in collaboration with ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations) directorate, 
takes care of this dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, 
emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as 
well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors 
influence this dimension. Therefore, operations like PSYOP have a major role to 
play here.  
                                            
128 JP 3-13, “Information Operations.” 
129 Ibid., 3. 
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2. Principles of Information Operations and Core IO Capabilities 
Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating 
essential information while denying it to the adversary and other target 
audiences. Basically, this constitutes the most essential and critical element of 
any campaign. This is implemented through one of the core capabilities of IO 
which is OPSEC (Operational Security). Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, 
OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many 
centuries; now they have been joined by EW and CNO. The following outlines of 
IO capabilities have been taken directly from the referenced documents and are 
provided as background. 
a. Psychological Operations130 
PSYOPs are planned operations to convey selected truthful 
information and indicators to target audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of their governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or 
reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP 
personnel advise the commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological 
impacts of every aspect of force employment, and how to develop a strategy for 
developing and planning the dissemination of specific PSYOP programs. During 
a crisis, a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) is deployed. A POAT is a small, 
tailored team of PSYOP planners, product distribution/dissemination, and 
logistics specialists. The POAT assesses the situation, develops PSYOP 




                                            
130 JP 3-13, “Information Operations,” Ch. 2, 1. 
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b. PSYOP as an IO Core Capability131 
In today’s information environment, even PSYOPs conducted at the 
tactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval 
process that must be understood, and the necessity for timely decisions is 
fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This is particularly important in the early 
stages of an operation given the time it takes to develop, design, produce, 
distribute, disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. PSYOP must 
be coordinated with CI (Counterintelligence), MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure de-
confliction and control. There must be close cooperation and coordination 
between PSYOP and PA staff in order to maintain credibility with their respective 
audiences. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and 
coordination of the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly 
PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO, and EW.132  
c. Military Deception 
MILDEC is described as being those actions executed to 
deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, 
intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions 
that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ mission. MILDEC 
and OPSEC are complementary activities — MILDEC seeks to encourage 
incorrect analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, 
while OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an adversary and prevent correct 
deduction of friendly plans. All the Information Operations capabilities have 
competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the resources 
required for the real operation. For this reason, the deception plan should be 
developed concurrently with the real plan. 
                                            
131 JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” September 5, 2003, Ch. 4, 3. 
132 JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” Ch. 4, 5. 
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d. MILDEC as an IO Core Capability133 
MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. It exploits the adversary’s 
information systems, processes, and capabilities. MILDEC relies upon 
understanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and plan 
and how they use information management to support their efforts. Each of the 
core, supporting, and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of 
successful MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time.  
e. Operations Security134 
OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and 
subsequently analyzing friendly actions and other activities to: identify what 
friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate 
knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers 
critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversary 
decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information.   
f. OPSEC as an IO Core Capability135 
OPSEC complements MILDEC by denying adversary information 
required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. The 
process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking 
measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a 
defense-in-depth approach. To be effective, other types of security measures like 
physical security, IA (Information Assurance) programs, computer network 
defense (CND), etc. must complement OPSEC.  
 
 
                                            
133 JP 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception,” May 31, 1996, viii. 
134 JP 3-13, “Information Operations,” Ch.4, 3. 
135 JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security,” January 24, 1997, Ch. 2, 1. 
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g. Electronic Warfare136 
EW refers to any military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic (EM) and directed energy to control the EM spectrum. EW 
includes three major subdivisions: EA, electronic protection (EP), and electronic 
warfare support (ES). EA (Electronic attack) involves the use of EM energy, 
directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or 
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary 
combat capability. EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists 
of actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to 
search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and 
unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, 
targeting, planning, and conducting of future operations.  
h. EW as an IO Core Capability 
EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensive and 
defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt, 
and exploit adversarial use of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom 
of action in that spectrum. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and 
computer usage extends both the utility and threat of EW. All of the core, 
supporting, and related IO capabilities either directly use EW or indirectly benefit 
from EW.   
i. Computer Network Operations137 
CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military 
operations. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and 
supporting IT infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, 
along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade and disrupt core, supporting, 
                                            
136 JP 3-13.1, “Electronic Warfare,” January 25, 2007, Ch.3, 1. 
137 JP 3-13, “Information Operations,” Ch. 4, 1. 
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and related Information Operations capabilities, and to deny, exploit, and defend 
electronic information and infrastructure.  
j. CNO as an IO Core Capability 
The increasing reliance of sophisticated militaries and terrorist 
groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2 forces 
reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability of 
computers and the range of their employment broaden, new vulnerabilities and 
opportunities continue to develop. This offers both opportunities to attack and 
exploit an adversary’s computer system weaknesses.  
3. Information Operations Supporting Capabilities 
Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, 
and COMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information 
environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and 
coordinated with the core capabilities. 
a. Information Assurance138 
IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority.   
b. IA as a Supporting Capability for IO 
IO depends on IA to protect information and information systems. 
IA and IO have an operational relationship in which IO are concerned with the 
coordination of military activities in the information environment, while IA protects 
                                            
138 JP 3-13, “Information Operations.”  
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the electronic and automated portions of the information environment. IA and all 
aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other to be effective.139 
c. Physical Security140 
Physical security is concerned with physical measures designed to 
safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 
material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, 
damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining 
vulnerabilities to known threats, and applying appropriate deterrent, control and 
denial techniques responding to changing conditions. 
d. Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO 
Just as IA protects friendly electronic information and information 
systems, physical security protects physical facilities containing information and 
information systems. Physical security often contributes to OPSEC, particularly in 
the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity could 
compromise the real plan.   
e. Physical Attack141 
The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. 
Physical attack disrupts, damages, or destroys adversary targets through 
destructive power. Physical attack can also be used to create or alter adversary 
perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems. 
 
 
                                            
139 DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance (IA),” and DoD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2, 
“Information Assurance (IA).” 
140 JP 3-07.2, “Antiterrorism;” JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations;” and JP 
3-10, “Joint Security Operations in Theater.” 
141 JP 3-13, “Information Operations.”  
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f. Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO 
Physical attack can be employed in support of IO as a means of 
attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy ability to exercise C2. IO capabilities, like 
PSYPO for example, can be employed in support of a physical attack to 
maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary.    
g. Counterintelligence142 
CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to 
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, or sabotage conducted by 
or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof.  
h. CI as a Supporting Capability for IO 
CI procedures are a critical part of guarding friendly information and 
information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA, physical 
security, CI, and OPSEC with risk management procedures offers the best 
chance to protect friendly information and information systems from adversary 
actions.   
i. Combat Camera 
The COMCAM mission is to provide the combatant commands and 
other higher-ups with an imagery capability in support of operational and 
planning requirements across the range of military operations.  
j. Combat Camera as a Supporting Capability for IO 
COMCAM supports all of the capabilities of IO that use images of 
friendly force operations to influence an adversary or support its own forces or 
                                            
142 JP 2-01.2, “Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Operations.”   
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allies.143 They provide images for PSYOP, MILDEC, PA, and CMO use, but can 
also be used for BDA/measures of effectiveness (MOEs) analysis. COMCAM can 
also provide records of IO actions for subsequent rebuttal proceedings.   
k. Information Operations Related Capabilities 
These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must 
always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO 
capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate 
must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration 
in the planning and conducting of IO.  
l. Public Affairs144 
PA is public information, command information, and community 
relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences. PA is 
essential for joint forces information superiority, and credible PA operations are 
necessary to support the commander’s mission and maintain essential public 
liaisons.  
m. Civil-Military Operations145 
CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-
governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. 
They are conducted across the range of military operations to address root 
causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be 
conducted independent of other military operations. CMO may include 
                                            
143 Field Manual [FM] 3-55.12; Marine Corps Reference Publication [MCRP] 3-33.7A; Naval 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [NTTP] 3-13.12; Air Force Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (Instruction) [AFTTP [1]] 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Joint Combat Camera Operations. 
144 JP 3-61, “Public Affairs.” 
145 JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.” 
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performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the 
responsibility of local, regional, or national government.   
n. CMO as a Related Capability to IO 
CMO can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre- or post-
combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained. Early 
consideration of the civil-military environment in which operations will take place 
is important. As with PA, the CMO staff also has an important role to play in the 
development of broader IO plans and objectives. Distribution of information about 
CMO efforts and results through PA and PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a 
broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals. 
o. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy146 
DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by military and 
state components, in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy 
efforts of the government.  
4. How IO Targets an Adversary 
IO may target human decision making or automated decision support 
systems with specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to 
be targeted with increasing precision and affords more sophisticated ways to 
protect it. The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information 
environment in order to affect decision making and thinking processes, 
knowledge, and understanding of the situation. 
                                            
146 DODD 3600.1, “Information Operations (IO).” 
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5. How IO Can Affect Data 
IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways: 
• By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that 
add, modify, or remove information from the environment of 
decision makers. 
• By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, 
communicates, processes, and/or stores information in support of 
decision makers. 
• By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use 
data, information, and knowledge. 
6. Various Effects Which Can Be Achieved Through IO 
All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive 
operations. Commanders use IO capabilities simultaneously to accomplish the 
mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations and 
systems. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following: 
• Destroy. To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot 
perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without 
being entirely rebuilt. 
• Disrupt. To break or interrupt the flow of information. 
• Degrade. To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 
or communication systems, and information collection efforts or 
means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit. 
• Deny. To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical 
information, systems, and services. 
• Deceive. To cause a person to believe what is not true.  
• Exploit. To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect 
information or to plant false or misleading information. 
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• Influence. To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to own 
forces. 
• Protect. To take action to guard against espionage or capture of 
sensitive equipment and information. 
• Detect. To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of 
an intrusion into information systems. 
• Restore. To bring information and systems back to their original 
state. 





VIII. IO HELPFULNESS IN DEFUSING THE BALOCHISTAN 
SITUATION AND APPLICABILITY OF IO CAPABILITIES 
The situation in Balochistan is unique in the sense that it is internal to 
Pakistan, yet has many influential hands manipulating it from outside the country. 
Balochistan's strategic significance and natural endowment make it a critical 
province for Pakistan. Strategically, Balochistan bridges Central, South, 
Southeast and East Asia on one end, and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the 
Middle East on the other. Regional states, especially India, cannot reach the 
energy and trade markets of the Caspian Sea region without transit through 
Balochistan. Iran is also not comfortable with the development of the deep sea 
port of Gawadar.  
The Taliban are alleged to have some operational bases in Balochistan, in 
addition to those in Pakistan's tribal north. In the west, Sistan-Balochistan, also 
known as western Balochistan, is up in arms against the Iranian government. On 
December 15, 2005, a daring assassination bid was mounted against a 
motorcade of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad on the Zabul-Saravan 
Highway, in which one of his bodyguards was killed.147 Pressure is, therefore, 
mounting on Islamabad to resolve the situation in Balochistan before it spirals out 
of control.  
Pakistan has been watchful of Balochistan's violent surroundings, 
especially since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, which delivered Kabul from 
the Taliban. Yet the Taliban, however repugnant, were Pakistan's guardians of its 
northwestern frontier with Afghanistan and its southwestern border with Iran, 
freeing up Pakistan's military resources to allow it to fortify its eastern border with 
India. Since the Taliban's toppling in 2001, Pakistan feels that its western border 
is now exposed to "hostile intentions." It has since moved fast to build up its 
military presence in Balochistan, planning a host of garrisons all across the 
                                            
147 Terrorism Monitor, February 23, 2007. 
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province. Pakistan also began to build naval defenses in Balochistan to 
safeguard its nearly 1,000 kilometer coastline. One such defense installation is 
the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara, which is the Pakistan Navy's (PN) second 
largest base after its flagship naval port in Karachi. The Jinnah Naval Base has 
displayed Balochistan's paramount naval importance that has long been envied 
by regional powers, including the former Soviet Union and India. Yet the Jinnah 
Base is ancillary to the development of Pakistan's ultimate naval defenses in 
Balochistan's coastal town of Gawadar, which sits along the Arabian Sea coast. 
The tribal and Sardari System has been going on for centuries in 
Balochistan. The Baloch Sardars and Numdars were able to keep their hold on 
the tribes due to backwardness and limited or no access of the people to 
resources. Now, as the government of Pakistan is going through with the mega 
projects like the deep sea port of Gawadar, a coastal highway and other mineral 
exploration projects, the Sardars fear for their continued hold of the tribes. The 
complex situation in Balochistan does demand that it should not be dealt with 
through the power of conventional military resources; rather, it is the contention 
of this thesis that the elements of IO must be utilized to deal with the situation in 
an amicable and effective manner.  
A. APPLICABILITY OF IO CAPABILITIES IN BALOCHISTAN  
1. Psychological Operations 
PSYOPs are planned operations to convey selected truthful information 
and indicators to target audiences. Although this core capability of IO is mostly 
used against foreign audiences, its utility for local/domestic audiences can not be 
ruled out. Particular to the Balochistan issue, the application of PSYOPs is very 
much relevant. The poor socio-economic conditions prevailing in the majority of 
the province is due to fewer opportunities available to the masses. This 
phenomenon gets roots if development plans are not undertaken and mega 
projects related to all kind of industry, business, agriculture and other public 
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sectors are not seen and understood as beneficial by the general population. The 
road to prosperity for the Baloch majority lies in opening mega projects in the 
province, projects which can create economic activity for the poor people of the 
land. The fact that the so-called Sardars and Maliks are resisting government 
efforts to set up mega projects like Gawadar deep sea port indicates that the 
Sardars and other tribal heads do not want to see the poor Balochees prosper.   
One other fact which can be used in the realm of the PSYOP is that the 
royalties of the natural gas and other minerals extracted out of the province have 
not been utilized fully by the political and tribal heads, who instead have used 
most of them for their own personal benefits and luxuries. They never tried to use 
this money to establish schools and universities or to spend some amount for the 
general welfare of the poor people of the province by opening hospitals and other 
socially useful institutions. The fact that the present government is trying to uplift 
the socio and civic conditions of the public is a step in the right direction and 
must be appreciated.  
It is another fact that whenever the cantonments are opened locally they 
do generate economic activity for the area. The government plans to open 
cantonments in the entirety of Balochistan with the view to ensure the safety of 
natural gas plants as well as to make for better change in the life of the particular 
area in which the cantonment would be opened. With every cantonment, the 
housing, schools, medical centers and such facilities that do come to that place 
will ultimately contribute to the socio-economic improvement of the area. This 
approach by the government is also being rejected by the Sardars and Maliks 
with their own mal-intentions. This fact should also be considered for the 
exploitation by the PSYOPs teams.   
It is important to recognize that to conduct successful PSYOPs, all the 
efforts should be conducted with a deep analysis of the cultural strata, keeping in 
mind the traditions of Balochistan.  Not only this, but it would be more appropriate 
to develop the themes for individual tribes or a group of tribes who have common 
traditions and social setups. It cannot be universal for all the tribes as they differ 
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significantly in their customs and traditions. The sophisticated means like 
Internet, print media, and electronic media should be tailored appropriately to 
address the mental and social setup of the respective target audiences in 
Balochistan. However, if these resources would be employed in a general 
fashion to persuade the simple people of Balochistan, they are not likely to bear 
fruit as it is quite likely that the target audiences would not be able to pick them.  
A successful strategy for the PSYOPs campaign should first need to be 
researched with respect to having a complete match with the local grain, then it 
should be implemented in a phased manner. Nevertheless, this core competency 
has a great chance to contribute in the overall achievement of the objectives of 
the IO campaign.   
2. Military Deception 
Typically, this IO core capability is utilized against opponent militaries. In 
the case of the Balochistan situation, its application in the true sense is not 
envisaged. The militant factions are more expert in unconventional warfare, 
which is otherwise conducted against a powerful conventional force. So, the only 
way to use this core capability is to use it in conjunction with the PSYOP to 
convince the target audience that any violations of the law of the land or any 
attempt to make the law by the miscreants would be dealt with full military might 
without exception. The commitment of the armed forces to establish the writ of 
the law of the land will have positive results on the achievement of the objectives. 
For this purpose, the appreciation of the thought process of the decision makers 
of the miscreants should be done carefully and continuously at every level of the 
operation. Subsequently, the prevailing situation should be revisited to amend 
and mold themes in accordance with the changing environments.  
3. Operations Security 
In fact, the success of any operation depends upon the degree of success 
with which the OPSEC is maintained. In the case of Balochistan, the relevant 
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details of operation have to be kept secret to avoid them reaching the decision 
makers of violent factions. As it is not possible to deny all kinds of information 
about any operation, the first step could be to identify what information is critical 
information about their own forces and intentions. Then they could cause 
miscreant decision makers to pick up some information which appears to be 
relevant about the operation but is not critical, in other words to misjudge the 
relevance of known critical information. In doing this, the critical information about 
their own forces and intentions remain secure, whereas the adversary also feels 
that they are well-informed about the planning and intentions of the operation.   
4. Electronic Warfare 
This IO core capability, if used appropriately, can be of great help to 
conduct operations precisely with a minimum of collateral damage and casualties 
of their own troops. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and 
computer usage extends both the utility and threat of EW. In the Balochistan 
situation, the available means of controlling the electromagnetic spectrum will be 
of much use in order to know about the wireless traffic of the miscreants, while at 
the same time providing appropriate protection to one’s own communicating 
assets. All three elements of EW, electronic attack (EA), electronic protection 
(EP), and electronic warfare support (ES), should be used in unison to 
complement each other and with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or 
destroying the miscreant’s combat capability. Through the professional use of 
EP, the friendly use of the EM spectrum at all times before and during the 
operation can be ensured. Using the ES domain of EW, efforts should be made 
to intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and 
unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, 




5. Computer Network Operations 
Keeping in view the nature of the insurgency and the capabilities that the 
miscreants maintain in the Balochistan province, the utility of CNO as a full-
fledged core capability of IO is remote and limited. It is not expected that the 
miscreants are making use of networked computers and supporting IT 
infrastructure systems. However, overseas support, which is available to the 
miscreants in this field, suggests that all the measures at hand must be taken to 
protect one’s own infrastructures. In this regard, the CND (Computer Network 
Defense) operations such as to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to 
unauthorized activity in the computer networks should be ensured. Beside these, 
actions that not only protect computer systems from external resources but also 
from exploitation from within should also be considered while planning the IO 
campaign in the Balochistan province.  
B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES 
The supporting IO capabilities are either directly or indirectly involved in 
the information environment and contribute to effective IO campaign. If not all 
then most of the supporting IO capabilities are very much pertinent to the 
Balochistan province. Nevertheless, there would be a need to integrate and 
coordinate these supporting capabilities with the core capabilities. Sometimes 
they appear to be overlapping with the core capabilities, so their integration and 
coordination is a must for a successful IO campaign.  
1. Information Assurance 
All measures, as required under this capability, are essential to be used 
for the successful completion of the Balochistan campaign. These measures 
include the actions taken to protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation. If all such-like activities will be carried out, the information 
superiority will be ensured in our campaign in Balochistan.  
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2. Physical Security 
This aspect has two dimensions. One part of it is related to the security 
concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent 
unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents, and to 
safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The other part 
is related to the physical security of the troops. Under the prevailing 
environments in Balochistan, the 2nd aspect has immense importance, as it 
directly affects the intangible factor of the morale of the troops. The major 
impediment here is to identify the miscreants from the common people. If a 
mistake is committed in this task, the repercussions can be very grave. Instead of 
positive, the impression and perception builds up in a very negative way among 
the masses. This is especially important because success cannot be achieved 
without the help of common Balochis in this insurgency.  
3. Physical Attack 
No military operation can succeed without a physical attack on the 
opponents if the resistance is not willing to lay down arms without an armed 
conflict. But for Pakistan, security forces taking military action against their own 
people is a very sensitive issue. Therefore, all the diplomatic efforts to deal with 
the situation through peaceful negotiations must be tried before taking any 
physical military action. The situation, which is currently prevailing in Balochistan, 
warrants that physical military operations should be undertaken at a number of 
selected places. Foreign influence along the Afghan border and in the areas 
adjacent to the Iran border has enabled the miscreants to pick up sophisticated 
arms and have combat encounters with security forces. The destruction of 
natural gas pipelines is becoming routine in some of the more troubled areas. If 
the writ of the government is not restored in such areas, the miscreants may 
come to believe the government is not serious in establishing the rule of law in 
particular areas. Therefore, carefully planned and religiously executed military 
actions seem to be one of the options in establishing a better environment in 
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Balochistan. The expected results from such a venture may be further brightened 
if supporting PSYOPs back up the military campaign simultaneously.  
4. Counterintelligence 
Somewhat overlapping with operations security, CI procedures are a 
critical part of guarding friendly information and information systems. For a 
successful IO campaign in Balochistan a detailed and comprehensive security 
plan has to be chalked out. This security plan should integrate IA, physical 
security, CI, and OPSEC. Only a comprehensive and well synchronized and 
executed IO plan will help achieve campaign objectives in Balochistan.    
5. Combat Camera 
This sophisticated supporting IO capability can pay rich dividends in the 
accomplishment of the mission in Balochistan. The rugged and difficult 
mountainous terrain in the province makes it difficult to observe all the areas of 
operation through conventional means of surveillance. Even radars are not 
effective due to the line of sight problem here and there. The imagery obtained 
through the COMCAM mission can assist in ascertaining the latest activities and 
positions of the miscreants in various parts of the province. This would be of 
great help in planning and conducting military operations with minimum collateral 
damage and with maximum effective neutralization of the targets in the area. 
Subsequently, the battle damage assessment can also be conducted through 
COMCAM, which facilitates planning and the use of force to be employed in the 
later phases of the operation.  
C. INFORMATION OPERATIONS RELATED CAPABILITIES 
There are three military functions, PA, CMO, and DSPD, specified as 
related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO 
and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO 
capabilities. However, their primary purpose and the rules under which they 
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operate must not be compromised by keeping in mind the core and supporting IO 
activities. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and 
conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in 
close coordination with the IO planning staff for the entire campaign in 
Balochistan. 
1. Public Affairs 
PA again has two aspects, one is that it is related to the dissemination of 
information both to the friendly troops and friendly public audiences to counter 
the misinformation and disinformation spread by the adversary. This objective is 
achieved by the dissemination of truthful information. The second aspect of PA is 
that it provides security to OPSEC by taking the media into confidence by the 
pre-release of critical information. If this functionality of PA is not performed, it is 
most likely that critical information may reach the media in a manner which can 
compromise the OPSEC. In the operation in Balochistan, both the dimensions of 
PA would be pertinent. Fact-based information would help in building public 
opinion about the rationale for operation against the miscreants and would also 
ensure that the public of Balochistan does not believe the 
misinformation/propaganda launched by the miscreants. The independence and 
the openness, which the media enjoys in Pakistani society, also demands that 
the 2nd aspect of PA is used to its full extent. Otherwise, it is likely that critical 
operational information may be made public by the media, which would have 
serious repercussions on the operational planning of the campaign in 
Balochistan.   
2. CMO as a Related Capability to IO 
CMO can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre- or post-combat 
operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained. In the case 
of Balochistan, the prospects appear to be remote for CMO, but in fact the efforts 
to reach out to the poor masses may be productive. The majority of the Balochis 
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like to see their day-to-day life pass smoothly and without disturbance from the 
outside. So, under this phenomenon, CMO planned carefully and in a phased 
manner may be very effective in the Balochistan campaign.   
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IX. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PREAMBLE 
The first responsibility of any government is to provide security for its 
citizens. Political violence and terrorism fall into a gray area that may entail both 
foreign and domestic threats to state security. The challenge is to develop 
counter-terrorism strategies that deal effectively with the threat without 
antagonizing its citizens or neighboring states. Most counter-terrorist strategies 
focus on a military or police perspective and overlook the prospects for 
diplomacy, negotiation and reform, which is essentially the information operations 
domain. The Information Operations tools, if applied sensibly, can prove 
especially helpful in resolving the issues and conflicts to deflate the pressures 
with the least risk and the least cost.  
B. STRATEGY PARAMETERS 
The parameters of the strategy to deal with the insurgents and miscreants 
in Balochistan may have these cardinal features: 
• Make no deals with miscreants/insurgents and do not submit to 
blackmail.  
• Treat them as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the 
rule of law. Ultimately bring criminals to justice that attempt to 
damage the national resources and thereby challenge the writ of 
the government.  
• Apply maximum pressure on all influential groups/elements that 
sponsor and support miscreants by imposing economic, diplomatic, 
and political sanctions/restrictions. 
• Have a clear-cut dialogue with the suspected states who are fueling 
and supporting them to stop all such aid and activities. In the 
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pursuit of this objective help from allies like the U.S.A. can be of 
great value. 
• Work for changes in culture of the youth and make efforts in the 
overall socio development of the poor masses by creating 
economic activities in the province. 
• Equip and train the law enforcing and other security agencies to 
deal with the situation in an unconventional manner. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Poor Socio-Economic Conditions 
In today’s world, the quality of any social structure in a region is based on 
its economy. Better economic conditions generally reduce the chances of minor 
and major corruption and keep its masses away from crime. 
2. Writ of the Government 
The governments’ use of the masses for political objectives is a 
dangerous trend. Using the Sardars as agents has weakened the writ of the 
government and has strengthened the Sardari System.  
3. Sense of Political Deprivation Amongst the Masses 
Owing to the weaker writ of the government, the provincial matters have 
been handled or affected by Sardars according to their individual whims and 
wishes. This gave a sense of political deprivation to the common masses which 
has taken deep roots at present. 
4. The External Factor 
The geo-strategic importance of Balochistan is a major reason for the 
influence of external factors on the internal security environment of the province.  
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India and some other nations are believed to be financing the anti-state elements 
against the growing Chinese presence in Balochistan in mega projects such as 
Gwadar.  
5. Ineffectiveness of Law Enforcement Agencies 
The role of law enforcing agencies has not been aggressive against the 
criminals bred by the Sardars of the province. This has given the miscreants 
further courage to continue their criminal activities. 
6. Lack of an Infrastructure 
The province has been deprived of any major communication and road 
infrastructure. The development whatever was planned could not root in an area 
devoid of basic infrastructure and thereof incapable of absorbing the 
development package.  
7. Miscellaneous 
 Lack of job opportunities within and outside the province.  
 The law-and-order situation can also be attributed to the Afghan 
refugees, especially those who keep crossing the border un- 
checked. 
 Employment of army on Internal Security (IS) duties does not seem 
to be acceptable to most of the people. 
 Lack of awareness amongst the masses and low literacy level. 








1. Deliberate Pro-Active Planning 
In analyzing the Balochistan situation it is evident that the policies and 
strategies implemented thus far have always lacked deliberate planning. Most of 
the strategies devised were reactive in nature. Deliberate planning was 
considered to ensure that the response of government agencies is not only 
reactive but pro-active. This could have been done. This might have encouraged 
law enforcing agencies to follow a deliberate plan and thus execute it in a useful 
manner. In the absence of a deliberate proactive strategy to deal with the 
Balochistan situation, success seems to be a remote possibility.  
2. Lack of a Defined Goal 
Whenever efforts were put into stabilizing the situation in the province they 
lacked a clear-cut objective. The strategy to deal with the Balochistan situation 
has been more of a fire fighting practice and the resources were employed with 
no defined goals.  
3. Cutting the Lifelines 
Violent Political Groups (VPGs) such as the one operating in Balochistan 
need money, activists, public support, freedom to maneuver, access to weapons 
and explosives, secrecy, and publicity. Government can institute programs to 
deny and disrupt each of these lifelines. However, each such program entails 
other consequences that may provoke community anger and outrage, validate 
miscreant/dissident grievances, or encourage support for terrorism as a 
necessary evil. The organization, skills and training required may be beyond the 
scope of traditional police or military organizations to handle them amicably after 
the lifelines have been sufficiently denied.  
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4. Avoid Discrete Profiling 
Like soldiers that wear camouflage uniforms to blend into natural 
environments, or snipers seeking to disguise themselves, miscreants and 
dissidents work at blending into the settings of Balochistan’s various areas, both 
socially and culturally. As a result, they look like everybody else and can't be 
identified on sight. In cases where they share visible characteristics there is a 
temptation for authorities to attempt profiling, which can alienate communities, 
without focusing on specific individuals. Such measures often provoke an 
unwelcome backlash that deepens discord.  
5. Containment Strategy 
In the case of the Balochistan issue, except for a few, most of the 
miscreants/dissidents tend to come from a host community or a minority group 
that lives in a somewhat defined area, although they get support from overseas 
sources. An attempt can be made by the government pursuing the containment 
strategy designed to shrink, or limit, the conflict zone, which has been identified 
over the period. Barriers can be erected to restrict or deny access. Such 
measures make movement more difficult, but it is a slippery slope and problems 
can be further exacerbated by segregating communities, which in turn breeds 
greater hatreds and more miscreants in the society. 
6. Applicability of IO Tools 
The applicability of all Information Operations tools will be required for 
tackling the Balochistan situation in a professional manner. All the relevant IO 
core, related and supporting capabilities should be implemented wherever 
possible to reach to the solutions to Balochistan’s problems. Deliberate planning 
for PSYOPs can be very much cost-effective if it is prepared and executed with 
care and in an appropriate manner. 
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7. The Wholesome Approach 
The current situation in Balochistan is very turbulent and demands 
appropriate measures to be undertaken by the government. It may not be termed 
as an insurgent movement. However, if the issue is not amicably resolved in an 
earlier time frame, it may gather sufficient mass and generate the requisite 
momentum to bring the very integrity of the country into question. The options 
available to the government in order to resolve the issue are listed below. 
a. Option I - Political Handling 
Despite the negative influence of the Sardari System, Balochistan 
remains a very traditional area. Therefore, the Sardari Nizam should be dealt 
with realistically. In this regard, efforts should be made to persuade all Baloch 
Sardars and nationalist/sub-nationalist political parties to move towards a political 
solution. They may also be included in the provincial government. The 
government should also endeavor to provide similar funds and authority to all 
Sardars as being given to others for the development of their areas through 
streamlined procedures. The government should also take strong judicial action 
against those found involved in serious criminal and anti-state activities. 
(1)  Merits  
• Affords a political solution, generally acceptable to the masses and 
will create harmony on all major issues. 
• Apparently a compromising option but has the long-term potential 
to neutralize the Sardari Nizam. 
• The sub-nationalists, when satisfied, will be less vulnerable to 
hostile agencies. 
• Further deterioration of law-and-order can be avoided. 
• Does not entail heavy expenditures, thus affordable. 
• No chance for hostile media to exploit the situation. 
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(2)  Demerits 
• Relatively a weak course of action of compromise by the federal 
government, thus it is vulnerable to further exploitation by anti-
government elements/opposition to achieve maximum leverage, 
which may be detrimental to efficacy of the adopted course. 
• A long-term solution, which may take a U-turn if mishandled by the 
present or future governments. 
• Transitory acceptance of Sardari Nizam. 
b. Option II - Use of Force 
Troubled areas like Dera Bhugti, Kahran, Kohlu, and Wadh may 
need to be subdued through military operations and Sardari Nizam needs to be 
eliminated in Balochistan through state power and might. This option should also 
include massive economic development to free the common man from the 
clutches of Sardars.  
(1)  Merits 
• Writ of the present government will be established. 
• An immediate and direct solution to the problem. 
• This option may be able to obtain instantaneous response of 
general masses against Sardari Nizam. 
• Earlier economic development of affected areas will be possible. 
(2)  Demerits 
• The resultant collateral damage may develop more hatred in the 
hearts and minds of common Balochs. 
• May lead to insurgency-like situation. 
• Hostile elements can exploit the situation in international media, 
especially through human rights organizations. 
• A resource-heavy solution. 
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• May endanger national assets like gas fields and on-going mega 
projects during clashes with armed sub-nationalists. 
• Use of force cannot ensure lasting peace. 
c. Option III - Massive Economic Uplift 
With no change in the present political status, the government 
should undertake a massive economic uplift, both short-term and long-term at the 
fastest possible pace. In the meanwhile, pro-federation political rivals of the hard-
line Sardars should be given gradual governmental support. Simultaneously, all 
those found involved in serious anti-state activities should be handled strictly. 
(1)  Merits 
• The masses will be satisfied, and therefore will not fall prey to a 
sub-nationalist agenda. 
• Influence of Sardari Nizam will reduce gradually. 
• A policy of carrot-and-stick is adopted. 
• Will afford a progressive solution to the problem. 
• The writ of the government will gradually be established. 
(2)  Demerits  
• A resource-heavy solution. 
• Old policy of divide-and-rule may not work for a long time; therefore 
it will not be a permanent solution. 
d. Option IV – Ban and Restrictions 
The government can think of this option, but the merits and 
demerits of such option are very dicey. If it works, fine, the result may be very 
rewarding. However, simultaneously, chances are that the situation may further 
deteriorate. The different kind of bans and restrictions which can be thought of 
are listed below. 
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(1)  General Bans and Restrictions 
• Impose press censorship. 
• Ban opposition political parties. 
• Ban opposition newspapers. 
• Ban public assemblies. 
• Ban religious assemblies. 
• Ban or limit activities of community and humanitarian groups. 
• Ban protest marches and demonstrations. 
• Ban dissidents from appearing or speaking in public or in public 
media.  
• Erect barriers to separate factions, or deny movement and 
maneuvering. 
• Impose restrictions on travel. 
• Impose restrictions on employment of target populations. 
• Introduce extensive video surveillance. 
• Utilize electronic intelligence measures. 
• Use aerial surveillance measures. 
• Arrest dissident leaders. 
• Arrest outspoken critics, theologians, teachers, and intellectuals. 
• Impose limitations on citizenship, especially by the Taliban and 
Afghan refugees in the area. 
• Impose limits on property ownership and transfer. 
• Ban displays of certain flags and symbols. 
• Restrict target population commercial activities (exports/imports), 
with focus on smuggling from Afghanistan and Iran. 
(2)  Wide scale Measures  The state may adopt legislation 
for special powers and authority. These authorities may include: 
• Ability to stop and search individuals. 
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• Ability to enter and search homes, businesses and any other 
facilities. 
• Ability to monitor financial, phone, medical or library records. 
• Ability to detain people without notice, charges, trial or legal 
recourse. 
• Ability to conduct trials without legal counsel. 
• Ability to control (fabricate) evidence. 
• Ability to detain or convict on presumption of guilt. 
• Ability to convict on “intent” to conspire charges. 
• Ability to conduct unauthorized phone taps and surveillance.  
• Ability to declare martial law. 
8. Common Recommendations 
In fact it is a combination of all the options which the government must 
adopt in order to resolve the Balochistan issue in an amicable manner. The 
efforts and energy focused on one or two elements may provide relief 
temporarily, but ultimately for the long-term solution the government has to adopt 
multi-prong approaches considering all the available options. Some of the 
common recommendations are provided below. 
a. Educational Reforms  
(1) Educate the masses to think logically and they will revolt against 
the Sardari Nizam of their own accord. All efforts must be made to 
direct the masses towards educating their children. For this 
purpose, the system of free education should be introduced. 
Madrassas, especially with false Islamic teachings, should be 
checked to follow the true and enlightened religious values.  
(2) Teachers from other provinces with better incentives should be 
employed for creating cohesiveness with the Balochs and 
countering negative propaganda. 
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(3) Quota for Baloch students, along with scholarship in other 
provinces, should be enhanced and they should be provided with 
the opportunity to get an education in the elite schools in other 
provinces.  
b. Early Completion of Mega Projects 
The early completion of on-going mega projects like Gwadar deep 
sea port will usher an era of tremendous economic development and activity in 
the province. It will subsequently help in eliminating the socio-economic 
deprivation of the masses.  
c. Communication Infrastructure 
Development of a communication infrastructure like roads, 
telephones, ports, airports, etc. will not only help the federal government, Central 
Asian Republics (CARs), and China to establish a trade route through 
Balochistan, but will also improve the economic condition of the locals. 
d. Media Campaign 
The following aspects must be given due consideration: 
(1) The point of view of the government should be transmitted to the 
locals in their native languages. 
(2) The effects of Sardari Nizam and its relevance in the modern era 
should be tactfully handled, whereby the actual message should be 
conveyed to the masses without offending the Sardars. 
(3) The positive social, political, and economic effects of the mega 
projects undertaken by the government should be conveyed to the 
populace.  
(4) All efforts should be made to ensure that media reaches all areas 
and all segments of society.  
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e. Intelligence Gathering 
(1) Intelligence agencies must penetrate nationalist organizations in 
order to foil their nefarious designs before implementation. 
(2) Locals should be encouraged to join law enforcing agencies by 
lowering the selection standards and increasing incentives. 
(3) Other Sardars and tribal heads who support government policies 
should be given more projection, incentives, and support. 
f. Economic and Social Uplift 
It has been confessed at the highest level that Balochistan has 
been ignored in the past and that none of the previous governments took it 
seriously. There is a need to resolve the genuine grievances of the masses in 
terms of economic uplift and social development of the province.    
g. Small Developmental Projects 
Though the present regime has initiated a number of mega projects 
in the province, their effects are not likely to reach the masses in the immediate 
future. Hence, there is a need to undertake smaller projects within the length and 
breadth of the province, so that the masses will be able to get immediate relief. 
h. Dealing with Nawabs/Sardars 
Nawabs should not be allowed to adopt a unified stance. They 
should be dealt with politically as well as militarily. Thus, Ata ullah Mengal needs 
to be dealt with only politically, whereas the most militant of all the Sardars, Khair 
Baksh Marri, should be dealt with through force. 
i. Conversion of Areas 
Conversion of B (semi-go areas) areas into A areas (go-areas) 
should be undertaken immediately. This is essential to establish the writ of the  
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government as well as for undertaking the large mega projects in the area. The 
establishment of cantonments at specified new locations will of great help in 
achieving this objective. 
j. Law Enforcement Agencies 
Law enforcement agencies in Balochistan should be reinforced in 
their capacity and capability to handle the situation on their own, as the army’s 
involvement in IS (Internal Security) does not augur well in the overall context of 
solidarity. 
k. Check Against Smuggling 
Smuggling and gun running within Balochistan is one of the major 
destabilizing factors which need to be effectively checked. In this regard, law 
enforcement agencies should be given a free hand, especially at the Iran and 
Afghanistan borders. However, at the same time, the local people should also be 
accommodated in various job vacancies so that they can earn their living with 
respect. 
l. Dealing with the Sectarian Threat 
Law enforcement agencies have met considerable success in 
dealing with the networks involved in sectarian violence against the Shiite 
community and arresting culprits. But still, a lot is required to be done towards 
ushering-in the sectarian tolerance amongst various strata of society through the 
positive contribution of key religious figures.  
m. Afghan Refugees 
Law enforcement agencies must adopt strict measures to control 
the cross-border movement of Afghan Refugees. Routine checks at the 
international  border need to be enforced very effectively and any laxity should 
not be ignored to avoid refugees falling prey to criminals with vested interests. 
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n. Enhancement of Special Educational Quota 
The education standards in the province have suffered due to 
underdevelopment, corruption and social backwardness. Graduates from this 
province are therefore unable to compete with students from other parts of the 
country. It is therefore deemed essential that special quota in various public 
schools, Cadet Colleges in Balochistan and elsewhere in Pakistan for students of 
Balochistan, particularly from Marri and Bugti areas, be enhanced. 
o. Enrollment in the Armed Forces 
The people of Balochistan have minimum representation in the 
armed forces, especially among the senior ranks. It is therefore suggested that 
an extensive enrollment drive in the army may be taken up in areas of Marris, 
Bugtis and Mengals, etc. with a view to provide them with an employment 
opportunity.  
p. Role of the Media 
Sub-nationalists are backed by the ignorant and they thrive on the 
exploitation of this ignorance. Electronic and print media must be utilized to 
educate people so that their enormous potential can be directed towards nation 
building. As a first step, the government must ensure that Pakistan television 
broadcasts and mainstream publications are available in every part of 
Balochistan. Special programs may be run to expose the designs of sub-
nationalist elements with special emphasis on unveiling the vested interests of 
the Nawabs as well as other miscreants.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the path to peace and prosperity will lie in gradual evolution not 
revolution. Ironically, the activities that eventually help resolve political conflicts 
involving our own miscreants are often actions, or reforms that were demanded 
from the beginning. The cycle of violence is ultimately broken by a cycle of 
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reform. If there is one lesson from human history, it is that people will rebel and 
fight for justice and equality - they always have and always will. If there is a 
second lesson, it is the age-old maxim that none have ever given up power 
voluntarily. 
The security picture of Balochistan seems to be gloomy and grim, thus 
warranting an immediate and prompt response from all concerned. This not only 
includes the government functionaries, input from the general masses is also 
required. People-to-people contact, as has been started by the present regime, is 
likely to bring home the desired results. An amicable management of the 
Balochistan problems calls for wide-ranging changes in the existing system of 
governance and political management. The province should be given more 
financial, administrative and political autonomy in operational terms. No enduring 
solution of the Balochistan problem is possible unless the federal government 
decides to trim its role in the polity. Major concerns of the Baloch leaders about 
the on-going mega projects should be accommodated, even if this requires some 
changes in these projects 
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